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Abstract 
 
The topic of this thesis is the semantic prime KNOW of Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) 
theory. I take an in-depth look at this NSM prime, proposed to be a fundamental concept found 
in all the world’s languages, considering both linguistic and broader philosophical issues in 
relation to the KNOW hypothesis, i.e. the proposal that the concept represented by KNOW is a 
legitimate NSM prime. After introducing NSM and defending a specific “psychological” 
interpretation of the theory (Chapter 1), I outline the KNOW proposal, including discussion of the 
combinatorial properties ascribed to it and how they have evolved in recent years (Chapter 2). 
I then look at would-be counterexamples to the universality of KNOW from a handful of languages 
(Chapter 3). I argue that overall the prime stands up well to these challenges, though the case 
of Kalam (Pawley 1994) does raise some issues that require further investigation and possibly 
novel kinds of testis to resolve. Then in the first part of the “philosophical” side to the thesis, I 
draw a comparison with the KNOW hypothesis and Timothy Williamson’s (2001) view that 
knowing is a conceptually fundamental concept, finding both striking similarities and instructive 
differences between the positions (Chapter 4). Lastly, I consider the “experimental philosophy” 
findings made by Weinberg et al. (2001) on what looks like cultural variation in concepts of 
knowing, addressing the question of whether such results are problematic for the universality of 
the KNOW prime (Chapter 5). Here I contend that such studies do not pose a threat to KNOW, not 
least because they come with a multitude of methodological issues, including specifically 
linguistic issues, many of which could be prevented by constructing NSM-based questionnaires.  
In Chapter 6, I conclude, pointing to several important avenues for further research brought up 
by the discussion, both on the subject of continued research on the KNOW prime and in relation 
to interdisciplinary applications of NSM to philosophy.
 1 
 
 
Chapter 1. An Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction to the thesis  
The subject of this thesis is the semantic prime KNOW1 of Natural Semantic 
Metalanguage (NSM). NSM is a theory of meaning originally due to Anna 
Wierzbicka (1972), which has since flourished into a fully-fledged research program 
(e.g. Goddard & Wierzbicka 1994, 2002). According to the NSM view, there exists 
a small set of cross-linguistically universal and semantically unanalysable concepts, 
the semantic primes, in terms of which all other concepts of all the world’s 
languages are hypothesised to be definable, in the form of “reductive paraphrases” 
called explications.2 There are currently 65 proposed semantic primes, each 
hypothesised to have lexicalised counterparts (exponents) in all languages, and each 
accompanied by a set of combinatorial rules (syntactic frames) specifying how it 
can combine with the other primes. The NSM approach has significant practical 
applications wherever cross-cultural communication is involved (Goddard 2002a, 
2010; Wierzbicka 1997). But quite apart from its considerable usefulness in applied 
contexts, NSM is also of enormous theoretical interest, not only because it makes 
substantial universalist and variationist claims about language (Goddard 2001) but 
because of what I see as its far reaching implications for other disciplines, such as 
philosophy and the cognitive sciences. 
The purpose of this thesis is essentially to take an in-depth look at KNOW, 
examining both the NSM proposal itself, and how that proposal bears on some 
                                                
1 Small capitalisation is always used for the NSM primes.  
2 Both here and elsewhere in the thesis, the process of explication is described as “reductive” just because it involves 
defining a complex concept in terms of simpler concepts, ultimately in terms of maximally simple ones, i.e. the primes. 
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philosophical literature. On the linguistics side of things, I outline the NSM proposal 
about KNOW, discussing some of the ways in which it has evolved in recent years, 
and I address several possible challenges to the cross-linguistic universality of the 
prime. In the philosophical part of the thesis, I consider how the KNOW hypothesis3 
relates to some branches of analytic epistemology, i.e. the philosophy of knowledge 
within the analytic tradition. But why look in such detail at what is essentially one 
sixty-fifth of a theory of meaning? I have two reasons. The first is a general one: it 
is my contention that every NSM prime deserves (at least) the kind of attention that 
this thesis aims to give to KNOW. For while NSM can and should be evaluated as a 
whole, each NSM prime is also an independent hypothesis about the presence of a 
semantically simple concept in all languages, and as such requires in-depth 
consideration of its properties, defence from any would-be counterexamples, and 
discussion of any specific implications that it may have outside of semantics proper. 
The second reason is related specifically to the KNOW prime. At risk of displaying a 
little favouritism, I believe this prime is one of the most interesting proposed NSM 
primes, not least because the claim that ‘knowing’ is a fundamental concept of 
human languages directly bears on an entire foundational field of contemporary 
analytic philosophy. 
The thesis will proceed as follows. In what remains of this introductory 
chapter, I give a brief overview of NSM, then I argue for what I am calling the 
“psychological” interpretation of the theory, which involves the idea that NSM is 
best understood as a substantial psychological claim, rather than “just” a 
heuristically valuable methodology for comparing concepts across languages and 
                                                
3 Note that throughout the thesis I will refer to “the KNOW hypothesis”, “the KNOW claim” etc. whereby I mean the 
hypothesis that the concept represented by KNOW is a true NSM prime, i.e. a cross-linguistically universal and 
semantically unanalysable concept. 
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cultures. I also defend the idea that in certain cases, behavioural evidence of the kind 
sought in the psychological sciences may be necessary to properly support specific 
NSM claims. In Chapter 2, I look at the KNOW proposal in detail, both setting out its 
current grammar, and discussing some of ways this grammar has evolved over 
recent years. For example, I discuss the recently proposed explication for the 
commonly lexicalised concept of “experiential” or “familiarity” knowledge, e.g. 
French connaître and German kennen (Goddard & Wierzbicka 2013), thereby 
eliminating the problems with earlier attempts to treat those concepts as basic 
instantiations of the KNOW prime. In Chapter 3, I move to the subject of the proposed 
challenges to the universality of KNOW. I consider five languages in some detail: 
Arrernte (Harkins & Wilkins 1994), Acehnese (Durie et al. 1994), East Cree (Junker 
2008), Dalabon (Evans 2007), and Kalam (Pawley 1994). The first three cases are 
not presented as counterexamples to KNOW, but the identification of the prime in 
each of these languages presents some instructive obstacles; in the case of Dalabon 
and Kalam, however, the respective authors do argue that the language lacks a 
distinct exponent of the prime. I show that only in the case of Kalam is there any 
problem with disambiguating KNOW, due to the presence of “interprime polysemy” 
between primes of a similar conceptual category, and I argue that the best way to 
answer to this problem is to conduct more rigorous testing, not just language-
internal tests of the kind that is typical of NSM research, but behavioural 
experiments designed to try to get at speakers’ semantic representations from 
another angle. 
Chapters 4 and 5 are concerned with the intersection between the NSM and 
philosophy. Here I will consider how each of the two claims that are involved in the 
KNOW claim – its semantic unanalysability and its cross-linguistic universality – 
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relate to parts of the analytic epistemological literature. Thus Chapter 4 will be 
concerned with the “analytic project”, i.e. the traditional project to reductively 
define the concept of knowledge in philosophy, especially as it has evolved in 
response to Gettier cases, which are hypothetical cases that are thought to show the 
insufficiency of the once standard analysis of knowing as ‘justified, true belief’ 
(Gettier 1963). More specifically, I discuss Williamson’s (2001) alternative view of 
epistemology, the “knowledge first” thesis, essentially a rejoinder to the analytic 
project, whereby ‘knows’ is instead proposed to be fundamental and irreducible. 
Here I argue that there is an interesting consonance between this view and the KNOW 
hypothesis, but I also outline several ways in which, from an NSM perspective, 
Williamson’s argumentation falls short. I also suggest how NSM may be helpful in 
testing some residual questions in relation to philosophers’ intuitions about the 
constituent conditions of ‘knows’, in particular, the apparent entailment between 
‘knows’ and ‘true’. Chapter 5 centers on how newer work in epistemology, part of 
the so-called “experimental philosophy” movement, relates to the other main claim 
involved in the KNOW claim, viz. its universality. Here I critique the findings of 
Weinberg et al. (2001), the seminal study on experimental philosophy applied to 
epistemology, which purports to demonstrate cultural variation in epistemic 
intuitions, in particular, variation in when speakers are prepared to attribute ‘knows’ 
to a subject of a hypothetical scenario, such as a Gettier case. I contend that the 
conclusions of Weinberg et al.’s (2001) are problematic because their methodology 
is questionable on both general and especially linguistic-specific grounds. I also 
argue that even if the findings were correct, variation in epistemic intuitions would 
be best explained by non-semantic factors, in particular, in terms of the operation of 
different epistemic norms, and thus wouldn’t present a problem for the proposal that 
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KNOW is a universal semantic prime. I also show how NSM could be immensely 
useful in constructing more rigorous experiments for testing epistemic intuitions 
cross-culturally and cross-linguistically. In Chapter 6, I offer some concluding 
remarks and point to some of the most promising lines of further research on KNOW. 
I take the upshot of the thesis to be threefold. Firstly, the NSM proposal that 
KNOW is a semantic prime stands up well, overall, to the purported challenges to its 
universality, particularly in light of developments in the proposal of the last few 
years. Secondly, if we are willing to embrace the consequences of the psychological 
interpretation of NSM, there is a promising way forward for dealing with residual 
issues in difficult cases like that of Kalam’s apparent interprime polysemy, namely 
the construction of behavioural tests to support standard language-internal 
investigation. And thirdly, the KNOW hypothesis is rich in implications for 
philosophy, and further exploration into the many points of intersection should be 
rewarding on all sides. 
 
1.2 Introduction to NSM  
As I have said, NSM is a theory of meaning and a methodological approach to the 
study of linguistic meaning. Originally due to Wierzbicka (1972), NSM has since 
developed in leaps and bounds, having been studied in dozens of languages, over a 
good range of language families (Goddard & Wierzbicka 1994; Wierzbicka 1996; 
Goddard & Wierzbicka 2002; Goddard 2008).4 As I have said, the current proposal 
consists of 65 primes (Appendix I), each with its own combinatorial syntax, the 
syntactic frames, essentially the rules specifying how a prime can combine with the 
other primes. The idea is that all the other concepts of all the world’s languages are 
                                                
4  Note that ‘NSM’ is used to refer both to the metalanguage itself and to the theory thereof. 
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reducible to (and at some basic psychological level, can only be understood in terms 
of) the primes plus their associated syntax, resulting in reductive definitions called 
explications (Appendix II).  
For the approach to be successful, then, all languages need to be shown to 
have exponents (lexical instantiations) of all the primes, which need not be single 
words, and may instead be bound morphemes or phrasemes. Sometimes a language 
will have two or more realisations of one prime, with the choice dictated by some 
local grammatical feature, such as case, as in  English I~ME exponents.5 This is 
called (syntactically-constrained) allolexy and does not present a problem provided 
1) there is no specifiable difference in meaning between the two forms, and 2) the 
grammatical constraint can be clearly identified. And finally, an exponent of a prime 
may be polysemous, that is, it may have some additional, non-prime meanings 
specific to that language. Each case of polysemy is taken seriously by NSM 
researchers, but the general point is that it does not constitute a challenge to the 
existence of the prime in that language provided the prime meaning can be 
differentiated from the non-prime meanings. Standard tests for polysemy are used 
for this, such as 1) identifying disambiguating grammatical contexts, where one 
sense of the word can be forced by a given grammatical environment; and 2) 
locating what could be dubbed constrained antonymy, cases where only one of 
several senses of a word can be contrasted with another concept. 
Another central tool in NSM research are the primes’ canonical sentences, 
i.e. basic sentences couched predominately in NSM,6 the attempted translation of 
which is used to establish the existence and behaviour of a prime in a given language 
                                                
5 Where the tilde indicates allolexy. 
6 I say ‘predominately’ because other non-prime elements can be slotted into a canonical sentence. For example, third-
person singular pronouns and proper names are used. But these elements should be understood as standing in for the 
(inherently third-person) primes SOMEONE or SOMETHING. 
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(Goddard & Wierzbicka 2015, 2014b). Canonical sentences are supposed to capture 
the proposed universal meaning of the concept and, ideally, to exclude any 
extended, metaphorical or other possible meanings that the exponent of the prime 
may have in some, but not all, languages. The idea is that if such sentences can be 
translated without the addition or loss of any paraphrasable meaning, then the 
hypothesis that the prime exists in that language is supported. Note that canonical 
sentences were first used in a heuristic capacity in NSM research but have since 
evolved to have a theoretically significant role (Goddard & Wierzbicka 2002: 42). 
Canonical sentences are now seen to do the important job of “exemplify[ing] 
hypothetical combinatorics of the primes” (loc. cit.). That is, they are the “filled in” 
versions of the basic combinatorial possibilities available for the prime.  
It must also be stressed that it is not the prime’s lexical form simpliciter that 
is supposed to be unanalysable and universal across languages, but rather the prime 
plus its combinatorial properties and valency options, as specified by the syntactic 
frames posited for the prime. In fact, it could argued that it is the prime only as it 
appears in its syntactic frames that is proposed to be basic and universal. 
Finally, note that while the focus here is on an NSM prime, there are at least 
two other important pieces of NSM theoretical “machinery” besides the primes. 
Firstly, there are semantic molecules, which are semantically complex, “mid-level” 
concepts via which other concepts are explicated (defined). Some of these are 
specific to a given language (e.g. English animal), but others are proposed to be 
lexically instantiated in all languages, (e.g. women, hands, sky) (Goddard 2012). 
Secondly, there are the cultural scripts, which are essentially articulations of 
cultural norms that are couched in NSM; cultural scripts are put to use in describing 
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a whole range of broadly “pragmatic” features of language use that do not pertain 
to the fixed meaning of the concepts involved (Goddard & Wierzbicka 2004). 
 
1.3 The psychological interpretation of NSM 
As I have intimated, NSM can be interpreted in a variety of “strengths”, anything 
from a heuristically helpful approach to cross cultural communication, to a full-
blown metaphysical claim about what constitutes the “alphabet of human thought”7, 
or to put the latter more plainly, as a claim about our psychological resources or 
capacities. I believe that this latter the best way to make sense of NSM theory. On 
this view, NSM is not just a practically valuable approach to studying meaning 
across cultures. Rather, the primes and their associated grammar are proposed to be 
psychologically real elements of human cognition. This interpretation of NSM is 
close to that expressed in Goddard et al. (2014), who align NSM with a sort of 
“language of thought” hypothesis.8 Part and parcel with this kind of “realist” view 
of NSM is the idea that the primes are somehow realised in the brain, and thus must 
ultimately be given both ontogenetic (developmental) and phylogenetic 
(evolutionary) explanations.  
Whether or not all NSM researchers would be happy to accept this 
interpretation of the theoretical underpinnings of the approach is an open question, 
but I would argue that the psychological interpretation of NSM just described falls 
out quite naturally from the theory’s claims. After all, NSM theory is the hypothesis 
                                                
7 An idea associated with seventeenth century thinkers, especially Leibniz (e.g. 1961[1903]) as often cited by 
Wierzbicka, e.g. in her (1997: 22) and (1972: 8). 
8 A term popularised by Fodor (1975). But while the NSM view is reminiscent of Fodor’s ideas in very rough outline – 
namely, in being an empirical hypothesis about the existence of universal, inborn concepts, in terms of which all our 
explicit thinking is done (Murat 2015) – the views incorporate some very different claims and thus should be seen as 
independent. For example, Fodor (e.g. 2008: 139) has expressed suspicion of the idea that (even non-primitive) concepts 
are “learnt” in the standard sense, which doesn’t sit well with the NSM contention that most concepts are culturally 
specific and thus are learnt (specifically, learnt via cultural means). 
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that the (final list of) primes are the only concepts found in all languages that aren’t 
understood in terms of other concepts and via which all other concepts must be 
understood. But why should this be true? Unless it is by some great accident, the 
most ready explanation is that the NSM primes are psychologically real conceptual 
atoms that are “inherent in the cognitive apparatus of Homo Sapiens” (Goddard et 
al. 2014: 61).9 
A final point is that if the psychological interpretation of NSM is right, this 
suggests that behavioural evidence of the kind strived for in the discipline of 
psychology could play an important role in supporting conclusions of NSM 
research. That is, I think NSM researchers should be open to using controlled 
behavioural experiments into speakers’ semantic intuitions, in addition to the 
language-internal tests discussed in §1.2 – whether it is to support the distinctness 
of two primes that share some morphological material (§3.3), or to help settle a 
particularly problematic case of polysemy (§3.5). This may involve what might be 
dubbed “button-pushing” tests,10 or verbal questionnaires that avoid the method of 
direct elicitation. What is important about such tests is that, when conducted 
properly, they may point more directly to speakers’ semantic representations than 
language-internal tests could ever be expected to. Of course, designing sophisticated 
and well-controlled experiments of this kind is no easy feat, but nevertheless, I think 
the incorporation of such methods constitutes an important part of setting NSM 
claims on the strongest possible theoretical and empirical foundations. 
 
 
                                                
9 The term “innate” knowledge springs to mind here, but I avoid using this term due to its rather hairy application in the 
sciences. See Mameli & Bateson (2006), and Samuels (2004) for discussion. 
10 This term is inspired by Chomsky’s (1983) (somewhat disparaging) characterization of lab-based behavioural tests. 
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Chapter 2. The KNOW prime 
In this chapter we delve into the subject of the thesis proper: the proposal that a 
concept of ‘knowing’ is a universal semantic primitive.  
 
2.1 The advent of KNOW 
KNOW is now an established member of the NSM inventory, but it was not one of 
the original fourteen proposed by Wierzbicka (1972). Wierzbicka’s original idea 
was that ‘know’ (or rather Polish wiedzieć) could be defined in terms of ‘can say’, 
as in the following example, applied to an instance of propositional knowledge:11 
 
(1) Ja wiem, że stolicą Portugalii jest Lizbona.  
= Ja mogę powiedzieć, jakie miasto jest stolicą Portugalii: Lizbona.  
I know that Lisbon is the capital of Portugal.  
= I can say what town is the capital of Portugal: Lisbon. 
 
In Lingua Mentalis (1980: 156), however, Wierzbicka discussed an objection that 
threatened this analysis, in the form of an argument from Andrzej Bogusławski 
(1979) on the attribution of ‘knowing’ and ‘saying’ to animals. In brief, 
Bogusławski argued that while it doesn’t make sense to talk of animals ‘saying’ 
things, it is intelligible to talk of their ‘knowing’ things. According to Wierzbicka 
(1980), if this were correct, the analysis of ‘knowing’ in terms of what one ‘can say’ 
would be undermined, and absent a viable analysis, would suggest that the concept 
may in fact be best treated as basic and unanalysable (as per Bogusławski’s view)12. 
                                                
11 As analysed in her Dociekania Semantyczne (1969) (Anna Wierzbicka, personal communication, February 2016). 
12 See Bogusławski (2007) on the idea that knowing, or in particular, knowing that, is a primitive or “key” concept, a 
view reminiscent of Williamson’s (2001) knowledge first thesis discussed in Chapter 4. 
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 Is Bogusławski right? There certainly does seem to be a widely-held folk 
belief that “higher” animals (at least) can know things. Testament to this is the fact 
that many epistemologists will reject an analysis of knowledge that does not allow 
for animal knowers, on the grounds that it is too demanding (e.g. Dretske 1985: 177; 
Bonjour 2005: 242). Behavioural ecologists also talk seriously about animals know 
things, beyond a mere anthropomorphic metaphor (e.g. Bekoff 2003; see also 
Kornblith 1999).13 As to whether animals can be regarded as ‘saying’ things, I 
would tend to agree with Bogusławski that (with the exception of our pets, perhaps) 
it does sound odd to talk of animals ‘saying’ things.14 Leaving aside this argument, 
however, (1) falls short for other reasons. For one thing, it cannot account for certain 
non-propositional or non-verbalisable knowledge, in particular ‘know how’ 
meanings, such as ‘I know how to swim’. Such a sentence simply cannot be reduced 
to what the subject ‘can say’: my knowing how to swim does not mean I can say 
anything about what it is that I know.15 
Wierzbicka (1980: 37, 156) indicated her sympathy to Bogusławski’s 
argument, and to the possibility that ‘knowing’ might be best considered a primitive 
concept. By the time of Lexical and Semantic Universals (Goddard & Wierzbicka 
1994), KNOW had taken its place in the NSM inventory, with its existence being 
attested in a wide variety of languages in this volume, among them French, Polish, 
Chinese, Longgu, Yankunytjatjara, and Ewe. Since then, it has been tested in tens 
of other languages, including, for example, Malay (Goddard 2002b), Italian (Farese 
                                                
13 At least, Bekoff talks of “higher” animals such as orcas and monkeys knowing things (2003: 5, 57). I am unsure to 
what extent it is common among biologists to talk about “lower” animals (e.g. insects) knowing things in a non-
metaphorical sense. 
14 Though the extent to which saying is equated with verbal communication is important here; the meaning of the NSM 
prime SAY is not exclusively verbal (a meaning which can be expressed in NSM as ‘say with words’). While animals 
obviously cannot say things with words, perhaps they can be regarded as saying things with their bodies. It is still my 
feeling that this would be odd to say of animals besides our pets, but the intuition needs further investigation. 
15 To be clear, as we will see later “knowledge how” is not seen as reducible to “knowledge that” on the current view 
either; instead, both constructions are seen as semantically complex and built up from the KNOW prime. But the point 
here is just that the ‘can say’ view of propositional knowledge has no hope of covering ‘know how’ meanings, so the 
latter would need an entirely distinct analysis. 
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2015), Amharic (Amberber 2008), East Cree (Junker 2008), and Wolof (Bondéelle 
2015). Thus I think it is fair to that the KNOW hypothesis has significant empirical 
support, having been tested in a significant number of languages, drawn from a 
reasonably wide range of language families. Of course, one can always counter, à 
la Evans and Levinson (2009), that the number of languages spoken far exceeds the 
number of languages tested, by several orders of magnitude. But I think it would be 
excessive to suggest that we need to test each and every language in order to say 
that a prime is cross-linguistic universal; it is methodical sampling of a considered 
variety of language families that is required, and this is what NSM research is aimed 
at. Of course, as ever in linguistics, investigating more languages is desirable, but 
the incompleteness of the NSM program does not constitute an argument against its 
plausibility. 
Now that I have traced how KNOW came to enter the NSM inventory and the 
extent of the testing so far, it is time to consider the proposal in more detail. In the 
following section I will outline the “grammar” currently ascribed to the prime. 
  
2.2. The “Grammar” of KNOW 
 
2.2.1 Syntactic Frames  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, each prime has a set of “syntactic frames”, which 
specify the ways in which it may combine with other primes and the particular 
valency options it permits, and which are hypothesised to be available for all 
exponents of the prime. In a sense, then, these combinatorial possibilities can be 
seen as constituting the “universal grammar” of the prime. 
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The valency options of KNOW, then, are similar to those available for the 
other mental predicates, THINK and WANT (Table 1). Firstly, KNOW takes a 
“psychological subject”, i.e. I, YOU, SOMEONE, and PEOPLE (Wierzbicka 1996: 119). 
It also allows a “substantive topic” (realised in English as “know about something”) 
and a “substantive complement” (realised in English as simply “know something”). 
These combinatorial possibilities are summarised as follows (with the options for 
THINK and some of those for WANT included for comparison): 
 
Table 1. Syntactic Frames for mental predicates (KNOW, THINK, and WANT)16 
KNOW   
 (1) X know(s) (it) a 
 (2) X know(s) something b 
 (3) X know(s) something about someone/something 
   
THINK   
 (1) X thinks like this: “       ” 
 (2) X thinks something (good/bad) about someone/something  
 (3) 
 
X is thinking about something 
WANT  
(partial) (1) X wants something 
 (2) X wants to do something 
 (3) X wants something to happen 
 (4) X wants to know something 
a X stands for any psychological subject (e.g. I, SOMEONE, PEOPLE) or permutation thereof (e.g. ‘THIS SOMEONE’, 
‘MANY PEOPLE’) 
 
                                                
16 Adapted from Goddard & Wierzbicka (2002: 60f), updated to conform to recent thinking, e.g. the option “(X) knows 
that      ” listed there is no longer available, as discussed in 2.3.2. 
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Note that ‘SOMEONE’ and ‘SOMETHING’ in the above sentences have their own 
syntactic properties and thus can be altered by the quantifiers (MANY, ALL etc.) and 
determiners (THIS, SAME, OTHER), creating permutations such as ‘MANY THINGS’ and 
‘SOME PEOPLE’. Furthermore, like a number of the primes, KNOW combines with the 
so called meta-predicates NOT and CAN (Goddard 2008: 15). 
 
2.2.2 Canonical Sentences  
I argued in the Chapter 1 that each NSM prime constitutes an independent 
hypothesis, a claim that has to be independently assessed, and its existence in the 
languages of the world independently tested. As I also discussed there, the central 
tool for testing the existence and behaviour of a prime in a given language is the 
attempted translation of canonical sentences. So what are the proposed canonical 
sentences used for testing the existence of KNOW in other languages? The current 
proposal includes the following (from Goddard & Wierzbicka 2015): 
 
Table 2. Some canonical sentences for KNOW: 
(i)  I know (it) 
(ii)  He knows much (many things) about things like this. 
(iii)  Where is he now? I don’t know. Maybe Mary knows. 
(iv)  I know/don’t know these people.17,18 
 
                                                
17 Note that this is a slightly altered version of G&W’s (2015a) original canonical sentence ‘I know that person’. This 
version is preferable because PEOPLE and not ‘person’ is an NSM prime. 
18 I have reservations about using this “experiential” or “familiarity” construction as a canonical sentence of KNOW. As 
G&W (2015a: 2) note, “[t]he word for ‘knowing (someone)’ will often be different to the word for ‘knowing 
(something)’”. On the current view, such experiential knowing concepts are seen as semantically complex, explicated in 
terms of KNOW (§2.3.2). I am not sure, then, that (iv) should be used to test the existence of KNOW. (This is not to say 
that it isn’t useful to translate (iv) in a new language, e.g. in order to establish whether it does have a lexicalised 
experiential knowing construction). 
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Note that (i) is a combination of the I and KNOW primes, i.e. ‘I know (it)’, where the 
object ‘it’ stands in for some sentence, which may or may not be expressed 
depending on the language (Wierzbicka in press). As for (ii)–(iii), note that they 
involve non-prime elements in the form of third person pronouns and names.19 
It is important to note that, just as is the case with the proposed primes and 
their syntactic frames, the canonical sentences are partly a matter of discovery; that 
is, they are negotiated in light of the available empirical evidence. For this reason, 
it is always possible that a given proposed canonical sentence could be found to be 
untranslatable in some language, and would thus have to be adjusted or even 
discarded. Depending on the canonical sentence, such a finding may also alter 
(typically reduce) what valency options are available for that prime. For example, 
if it were discovered that some language(s) didn’t permit the exponent of KNOW to 
be combined with a substantive topic and therefore (ii) was found to be 
untranslatable, then not only would (ii) be discarded as a canonical sentence for 
KNOW, but the valency options for KNOW listed in Table 1 would be reduced or 
changed. Thus it should be clear that testing the prime, its grammar, and its 
canonical sentences are projects necessarily undertaken together. 
Also note here that idiomaticity problems can arise when negotiating what 
the right canonical sentences are. In fact, there is something of an outstanding issue 
on this point in the case of (ii) in English: neither ‘He knows many things about 
things like this’ or ‘He knows much about things like this’ sound ideal in English; it 
is much more natural for say “He knows a lot about things like this”.20 Is this merely 
one of those cases in which NSM phrasing sounds unfamiliar, or is ‘knowing many 
                                                
19 See note 6 above. 
20 Though a further issue is that ‘I know a lot’ and ‘I know many things’ may not be equivalent in meaning, unlike in 
Polish where there is no such distinction (Anna Wierzbicka, personal communication, March 2016).  
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things’ not a permissible string of ordinary English? And if the latter is true, does 
that mean that this canonical sentence needs to be discarded, or rather that ‘a lot’ 
should be considered an allolex of MANY?  
Answering these questions, and analogous ones for the canonical sentences 
translated into other languages, are essential for determining both whether or not (ii) 
is the right canonical sentence for the purposes of testing the existence and 
behaviour of the prime. For my part, I am inclined to think that this case is simply 
one of those cases of NSM sounding marked, rather than there being any genuine 
incompatibility between KNOW and MANY THINGS. In support of this idea is the fact 
that ‘know(s) many things’ is reasonably well-attested in English, at least in poetry 
and lyrics.21 Furthermore, I think there may be a more general idiomaticity issue 
here, given that English ‘many things’ can sound somewhat “aphoristic” in the 
object slot of other verbs (e.g. “She saw many things on her travels”, “I learnt many 
things at the lecture today”). Nevertheless, it may be worth trying out another 
possible canonical sentence for KNOW, using SOMETHING/SOME THINGS instead of 
MANY THINGS, such as “He knows something about this” or “He knows some things 
about things like this”. 
 
2.3 Which know concept?  
I will now address the question of exactly what concept is being proposed to be a 
universal and irreducible semantic primitive.  
 
 
                                                
21 For example, in the title of the poem Men Say They Know Many Things by Henry Thoreau, and in a line of the song A 
thousand years, performed by Sting: "I may know many things, I may be ignorant". 
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2.3.1 ‘Know’ vs. ‘Knowledge’ 
The first thing to be clear on is that the relevant concept is ‘know(s)’, or ‘knowing’ 
and not ‘knowledge’. The issue here is not simply that in English, the ordinary way 
to express the prime happens to be via a verb and not a noun, for it is possible that 
in other languages its expression involves a nominal (or adjectival etc.) form. 
Rather, the claim is that the concept represented by the English abstract noun 
‘knowledge’ is neither plausibly unanalysable nor universal. As Wierzbicka (in 
press) discusses, some languages, such as the Australian language, Walpiri, appear 
to lack any serviceable equivalent to ‘knowledge’,22 and even in a nearby language 
like French, the concepts of connaissance and savoir cut across the English concept 
in different ways, without either having a sense quite equivalent to it (op.cit.: 10f). 
Thus the claim is not that ‘know(s)’ is basic and universal for some apriori reason 
(though it may be a prima facie better candidate for a prime, given its greater 
frequency in ordinary language), rather it is precisely because of the evidence 
unearthed by cross-linguistic semantic analysis that English ‘knowledge’ is not a 
credible candidate for an NSM prime, whereas ‘know(s)’ is.23  
 
2.3.2 The analysis of propositional and experiential knowing  
Now I will discuss how KNOW, as it is currently conceived, relates to (1) 
propositional knowledge (as in “I know that p”), and (2) what may be dubbed 
“experiential” knowledge, a concept that is lexicalised in various languages. Here 
we will see the most significant changes that the KNOW proposal has undergone. I 
will begin with (2), the concept of experiential knowledge. 
                                                
22 Laughren et al. (2006) cited in Wierzbicka (in press). 
23 But note that like Wierzbicka (in press), I will not hesitate to use English word ‘knowledge’ when discussing the issues 
surrounding the universal concept, in those cases where it sounds more natural than ‘know’. But KNOW always refer to 
the prime proper. 
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In many languages, including Romance languages, Polish,24 German,25 and 
Chinese,26 there is a lexically marked distinction between propositional knowledge 
(so-called “knowledge that”), and knowledge based on experience or familiarity, 
e.g. knowledge of people and places. In Italian, for example, we have sapere and 
conoscere, both translated as ‘know’ in English, yet clearly distinct in their uses, as 
the following examples show: 
 
(2) John sa che Oslo è la capitale della Norvegia. 
‘John knows that Oslo is the capital of Norway.’ 
 
(3) Luisa sa che le droghe sono pericolose. 
‘Luisa knows that drugs are dangerous.’ 
 
(4) John conosce bene Mosca. 
‘John knows Moscow well.’ 
 
(5) Luisa conosce Igor.   
‘Luisa knows Igor.’ 
 
As these examples show, sapere is used to express propositional knowledge, 
whereas conoscere indicates a kind of knowledge from experience or familiarity. 
Similar contrasts are possible in other languages, including French 
(savoir/connaître), German (wissen/kennen), Polish (wiedzieć/znać) and Chinese 
                                                
24 Wierzbicka (2002). 
25 See Wierzbicka (in press). 
26 Chappell (1994). 
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(zhīdao/rènshi).27 How does NSM deal with this contrast found in some languages 
but non-existent in others28? The original position was to treat the experiential 
knowing lexemes as syntactically-constrained allolexes of the KNOW prime. And 
indeed, if one looks to the examples above, a syntactic difference is obvious: sapere 
is followed by a clausal complement introduced by the complementiser che, while 
conoscere is followed by a nominal expression. This analysis doesn’t work, 
however, for at least two reasons. For one thing, it is possible to combine sapere 
with a nominal, as in the following:29 
 
(6) Non so i dettagli. 
‘I don’t know the details.’ 
 
A further problem with the allolex account is simply that ‘knowing someone X’ and 
‘knowing some place Y’ (as in (4) and (5) above) is intuitively quite different in 
meaning from ‘knowing that p’. Knowing a person or place involves some kind of 
non-verbalisable knowledge, perhaps akin to an ability to recognise or conjure up a 
mental image of the person or places. Propositional knowledge, by contrast, is 
verbalisable almost by definition.30 And while Wierzbicka (2002: 95) suggested that 
(in the case of Polish wiedziec/znać) this apparent difference in meaning may be due 
to the contribution of meaning of ‘someone’ (or ‘some place’) rather than any 
semantic difference between the verbs themselves, it was still perceived to be a 
problem (e.g. Goddard 2007: 15). But it was not until 2013 that explications of 
                                                
27 Chappell (1994: 117f) equates the distinction with that of French savoir/connaître and German wissen/kennen. 
28 Other languages in which propositional and experiential knowing are expressed using the same lexical form are 
Mangaaba-Mbula (Bugenhagen 2002: 12) and Amharic (Amberber 2008: 93f), and of course, English. 
29 Note that “Non conosco i dettagli” is also possible. 
30 See Wierzbicka (in press) for exploration of the verbalisable/non-verbalisable distinction. 
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‘knowing someone’ and ‘knowing a place’ (and thus of those uses of Italian 
conoscere etc.) was proposed (Goddard & Wierzbicka 2013). This analysis does not 
rely on the concept of propositional knowledge at all, but rather on the substantive 
topic frame, as follows:31 
 
(7) I know these people (conosco questa gente, ich kenne diese Leute etc.). 
I know some things about these people  
like people can know some things about some people if they have been with them 
before 
because of this, I can think like this:  
“these people are like this”  
 
(8) I know this place (conosco questo posto, ich kenne diesen Platz etc.). 
I know some things about this place 
like people can know some things about a place if they have been in this place 
before 
because of this, I can think like this:  
“this place is like this”  
 
With the availability of such an analyses in (7) and (8), English ‘knowing a 
person’ and ‘knowing a place’, and the analogous senses of Italian conoscere 
(French connaître, German kennen, etc.), no longer needed to be treated as allolexes 
of the KNOW (SAPERE/SAVOIR/WISSEN etc.) prime. They can instead be seen as 
                                                
31 (7) and (8) are adapted from Wierzbicka (in press). This version had a ‘because’ clause in the first line (i.e. ‘I know 
some things about these people/this place because I have been with them/in this place before’) instead of the second line 
appearing here. The version here is to be preferred because Italian conoscere at least does not necessarily require one to 
have met the person or been to the place. For example, if I have often seen a person on television, such that I feel very 
personally familiar with them, I could say that I conosco that person. Such an example can be seen in a 2015 YouTube 
video from the comedy duo theShow, available at the following address (at 1:09 minutes in): 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rwQWtmA4ENg&annotation_id=annotation_1693881917&src_vid=_fpLZC1K_
vc&feature=iv>. 
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independent and semantically complex concepts, with the KNOW prime as their 
central component. 
Arguably what prevented the above analyses from coming to light earlier was 
the focus on trying to reduce such constructions to propositional knowledge, i.e. to 
the syntactic frame ‘X know(s) that    ’, which was, until recently, proposed to be 
basic syntactic frame of KNOW (e.g. Goddard 2007: 16). That is, sentences such as 
those in (2) and (3) were treated as basic instantiations of KNOW. This treatment has 
since been abandoned, however, and an explication of know-that constructions has 
been proposed, based on the syntactic frame ‘X know(s) (it)’, (from Wierzbicka in 
press): 
 
(9) John knows that Oslo is the capital of Norway. 
it is like this: Oslo is the capital of Norway 
John knows it 
 
Of course, the material after ‘it is like this:’ remains unexplicated, but the idea is 
that (9) serves as the explication of the frame (essentially of the “propositional 
attitude”, minus its content). I would argue that this explication is plausible in that 
it captures an important feature of know-that claims: that they both set out some 
state of affairs and assert someone’s knowledge of it. That is, when I tell Luisa “John 
knows that Oslo is the capital of Norway”, it seems plausible that I am 
communicating to Luisa both that Oslo is the capital of Norway (“it is like this”), 
and that John stands in a particular relation to this fact (“he knows it”). 
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2.3.3 The analysis of know-how  
Finally, I would like to point to one other type of ‘know’ construction for which an 
NSM explication has been put forward, viz. “X knows how (to do something)”. This 
construction is interesting not least because “knowledge-how” (seen in opposition 
to “knowledge-that”) has an entire philosophical literature to its name, in which the 
central debate is whether or not knowledge-how can be reduced to knowledge-that 
(Fantl 2016). According to the NSM perspective, these are independent concepts, 
semantically analysable in terms of different basic constructions of the prime KNOW, 
as follows (from Wierzbicka in press): 
 
(10) She knows how to do it.  
 she can do it if she wants because she knows some things about it,32  
 like people can know some things about something if they have done it before  
 
Note that this (10) is much closer to the explications of the experiential knowing 
concepts ‘knowing someone’ and ‘knowing a place’ than it is to the explication of 
‘knowing that’, in that both refer to (non-necessary) personal experience (‘…like 
people can know…if they have done it before’). 
It is not possible here to give anywhere near an exhaustive treatment of all 
the constructions centred on KNOW, but it is worth handwaving to a few other 
examples of “epistemic” concepts and constructions that have been analysed in 
terms of the prime. For one example, consider that Wierzbicka (in press) offers 
explications of various (English) constructions involving ‘know’ plus a wh-word 
(e.g. when, where) via KNOW, including both direct wh-questions (‘Where does 
                                                
32 I have slightly altered Wierzbicka’s (in press) version, changing ‘…because she knows something’ to ‘…because she 
knows some things about it’, giving the right parallelism with the following line.  
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Mary live?’) and so-called “embedded” wh-questions (‘John knows where Mary 
lives’). Another important reach of explications involving KNOW is in the analysis 
of evidential markers, a feature of some languages in which information relating to 
the evidence or source of some piece of knowledge is grammaticalised (e.g. the 
source of knowledge being directly seen by the speaker vs. being heard about from 
other people) (Wierzbicka 1994b). 
 
 
Chapter 3. Challenges to the universality of KNOW 
In this chapter I look at problematic cases that have been encountered in the search 
for exponents of KNOW in other languages.  
 
3.1 Mparntwe Arrernte 
The first case I will consider is that of Mparntwe Arrernte (a variety of Arrernte 
spoken around Alice Springs), as analysed by Harkins and Wilkins (1994; 
henceforth H&W). This case demonstrates the relatively “easy” problem of 
establishing which of several candidates is the exponent of a prime. In Mparntwe 
Arrernte, then, there are two candidates for the exponent of KNOW: the adjectival 
form kaltye, which H&W define as ‘know (stative)’ and itelare-, which they define 
as ‘know (actively)’ (p. 289). Here is an example of each: 
 
(1) Ayenge  kaltye  unte  kurne  mpware-ke  
1SG:S know 2SG:A bad make/do-PC 
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‘I know you did something bad’ (i.e. I am knowledgeable of the fact that you did 
something bad’) 
 
(2) Ayenge  itelare-me  unte-rle  kurne  mpware-ke   
1SG:S know-NPP 2SG:A-that bad make/do-PC 
‘I know you did something bad’ (i.e. I am actively aware that you did something 
bad’) 
 
As we see in this pair of examples, kaltye and itelare- exhibit different 
syntactic behaviour. Whereas kaltye is a predicative nominal that takes dative, 
purposive, and sentential complements (p. 289), itelare- is clearly verbal, evident 
from its taking a non-past progressive TAM marker. Does this mean that kaltye and 
itelare- could be treated as syntactically-constrained allolexes of the Mparntwe 
Arrernte exponent of KNOW? This is a possibility, but I don’t think the authors 
clearly identify the specific grammatical contexts that condition the use of kaltye 
and itelare-.33 Instead, their suggestion to “regard both kaltye and itelare- as 
equivalents of KNOW with the choice conditioned by the active/stative distinction” 
(1994: 289) invokes what sounds more like a semantic distinction, given that 
“active” and “stative” grammatical labels generally encode substantial information 
about the participants’ level of activity or intention (doing or wanting). In other 
words, Harkins and Wilkins do not provide a clear case for syntactic environments 
conditioning the occurrence of kaltye and itelare-, but rather refer to what is 
essentially a contrast in the semantics of the two verbs, a contrast that they try to 
                                                
33 Compare English OTHER~ELSE, which are clearly syntactically-constrained allolexes of the same prime: OTHER appears 
before all NSM nominals, like ‘people’ and ‘things’, except the indefinites, like ‘someone’ and ‘something’, which take 
the postnominal ELSE. This is a robust contrast, such that e.g. *‘They saw some people else’ is clearly ungrammatical. 
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convey in the free translations via the phrases ‘knowledgeable of’ versus ‘actively 
aware’ in (1) and (2) above. 
In fact, if the free translations above are anything to go by, the most likely 
exponent of KNOW in Mparntwe Arrernte is kaltye. For whereas kaltye is translated 
as simply ‘know’/’knowledgeable’, H&W’s reference to “active awareness” in their 
translation of itelare- suggests that there is some extra semantic content involved in 
this concept, in addition to KNOW. In support of this analysis is the fact that Van 
Valin and Wilkins (1993: 523) define kaltye as ‘know (x,y)’, while attributing a 
more complex meaning to itelare- involving both ‘know’ and ‘think’.34 
Furthermore, note that there is an example appearing later in H&W’s paper which 
contains a construction conforming to basic syntactic frame of KNOW, and here 
kaltye is used (p. 294): 
 
(3) [...] kele   unte     kaltye     anteme    ane-me     ingkirreke-ke 
               OK    2SG:S    know      now         be-NPP      all-DAT 
‘… “so now you know everything”’ 
 
Thus while H&W aren’t prepared to deliver a verdict on the issue (pp. 289, 
308), I would argue that the evidence they present is sufficient to support the idea 
that kaltye is the Mparntwe Arrernte exponent of KNOW prime, and itelare- definable 
in terms of it (possibly with the addition of a component involving THINK, given 
Van Valin and Wilkins’ (1993) suggestion). This case shows us that when faced 
with two or more possibilities for the exponent of a prime, and where there is no 
strong case for syntactic allolexy, two things should be done to attempt to identify 
                                                
34 Though their exact definition is rather obscure: ‘think (x) about something.x.knows.be.in.mind’. 
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the exponent: 1) determine which form is used in translations of the proposed 
canonical sentences (or other basic sentences instantiating the proposed syntactic 
frames of the prime); and 2) consider whether one of the concepts conveys more 
semantic content than the other, and if so, attempt to explicate it in terms of the 
seemingly more basic concept. Not until both of these proved unsuccessful might 
there be cause for concern for the existence of KNOW in the language. 
 
3.2 Acehnese 
According to Durie, Bukari and Mawardi (1994, henceforth DBM), there is a 
problem with the identification of KNOW in Acehnese, an Austronesian language 
from Aceh, Indonesia. The perceived problem consists in the fact that certain 
“epistemological classifiers” – suffixes translated into English via wh- words, who, 
what, when etc. –  are obligatorily present on what the would-be exponent of KNOW 
in this language, the verbal stem tu-. Thus the issue according to these authors is 
that while tu- is a prima facie good candidate for the Acehnese exponent of KNOW, 
this form never appears alone, but is instead always accompanied by such markers, 
which often cannot be formally isolated from the tu- form, for example: 
 
(4) Lôn-tu-ho            geu-jak. 
I-know-whither  3-go 
‘I know which way he/she went.’ 
 
(5) Lôn-tusoe      ureueng    nyan. 
I-know:who   person      that 
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‘I know who that person is.’ (or ‘I know that person’)35  
 
(6) … hana     soe     toepeue           rasia    nyan. 
     NEGBE   who    know:what    secret   that 
‘… no-one would have known that secret.’ 
 
(7) … Na         ta-tujan        kapay     bungka? 
     NEGBE      you-know:when  ship  leave 
‘Do you know when the ship leaves?’ 
 
As DBM put it, these examples show that Acehnese “always require[s] one to say 
more than just KNOW” (p. 175). Why is this a problem? Well, DBM argue that if 
other languages do not exhibit the same “epistemological classification of KNOW”, 
then we are faced with “a classic type of non-translatability, but at the most primitive 
level in the metalanguage” (loc. cit.). As I understand it, the argument is that because 
the only way to use tu- is via the above forms (tuho, tusoe etc.), we have reason to 
think Acehnese has a basic conceptual division between different kinds of knowing 
(knowing what, knowing who etc.), which doesn’t necessarily exist in other 
languages, and therefore it is problematic to think of Acehnese tu- as representing 
the more minimal concept of KNOW. 
I will argue that while it is still not entirely clear which form(s) represent 
the Acehnese exponent(s) of KNOW, the data presented by DBM (1994) don’t give 
us reason to worry, especially in light of certain advances in the grammar proposed 
for KNOW. But before going on, a preliminary point on morphological complexity 
                                                
35 This alternative translation is offered by Xie (2016): according to his Acehnese consultants, such sentences “are 
ambiguous between an acquaintance/familiarity reading [i.e. I know that person] and an epistemic reading [i.e. I know 
who that person is]” (p. 4). 
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should be made. The existence of obligatory markers on the tu- stem does not, in 
and of itself, constitute a reason against the idea that tu- is the Acehnese exponent 
of the KNOW prime. This is no different from the many languages (including familiar 
European languages) in which person and number are obligatorily marked on many 
forms of the verb. There is no general reason to treat different forms of a verb as 
instantiating different basic concepts, rather than regarding the stem as carrying one 
meaning, and any markers as carrying others; this points holds whether the markers 
convey person, number, or indeed “epistemological” features.  
As I see it, then, the reason DBM considered this feature of Acehnese to be 
problematic comes down to the primacy that was afforded to the ‘know that’ frame 
then proposed to exist for KNOW, but which has since been discarded. That is, I think 
the authors were trying to reconcile the fact that tu-, taken alone (i.e. minus any 
epistemological classifiers), appeared to be the prima facie best candidate for the 
exponent of KNOW (because it is the common denominator in a whole host of 
constructions translated with ‘know’), with the fact that one of its marked forms, 
tupeue (‘know+whether’), is used in ‘know that’ constructions (p. 176). Because the 
know-that construction was then hypothesised to be one of the universal syntactic 
frames of the KNOW prime, tupeue had to be treated as an instantiation of KNOW, in 
addition to the bare form tu-. As we saw in §2.3.2, however, this frame has since 
been discarded. What I think also influenced DBM’s analysis was the fact that the 
constructions ‘knowing (someone)’ and ‘knowing (a place)’ were not yet 
definitively recognised as semantically complex and distinct from ‘knowing 
(something)’, meaning it would have been unclear how to treat the Acehnese forms 
like tusoe in (5). But again, now that explications for the experiential knowing 
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concepts ‘knowing (someone/these people)’ and ‘knowing (this place)’ have been 
proposed, this is no longer an issue.  
So there is no need to regard the forms used in the Acehnese equivalents of 
‘knowing that     ’, ‘knowing (someone/these people)’ and ‘knowing (this place)’ as 
basic instantiations of KNOW. Which form, then, should be considered the exponent 
of know? To establish this, we need to know which form(s) would be used in 
translating canonical sentences. While none of the examples in DBM (1994) involve 
such sentences, one example appears in Durie (1985: 162) that may be telling: 
 
(8) Jih  hana  i  teu-pue  sa  pue 
He  NEGBE  3  know-what one what 
‘He doesn’t know a thing’ 
 
This example broadly fits the syntactic frame ‘X knows something’, so assuming it 
isn’t a marked way to express ‘X doesn’t know anything’, it can be regarded as close 
to a canonical sentence. And if this is right, then teupue must be regarded as an 
instantiation of the Acehnese exponent of the prime. Now whether or not the bare 
stem tu- or indeed the form tupeue (‘know+whether’) should be considered (an) 
allolex(es) of the prime depends on what forms occur in the other syntactic frames, 
such as in the canonical sentence ‘He knows much (many things) about things like 
this’. At this stage, then, it seems to me that the best bet is to identify teupue as 
instantiating the Acehnese exponent of KNOW, with an open question as to whether 
it has one or more allolexes.36  
                                                
36 Note that Zhiguo Xie, who has worked with Acehnese speakers on the epistemological classifiers, has the intuition 
that tupeue (‘know+whether’) might be used in the trivalent sentences, though is unsure (Xie, personal communication, 
15 March 2016). If so, tupeue would have to count as an allolex. 
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The case of Acehnese reveals two important points. One is that language-
specific morphological complexity does not necessarily correlate with semantic 
complexity, a point I will return to presently in consideration of Evans’ (2007) 
analysis of Dalabon. Another is that, just as we saw with Arrernte, it is the canonical 
sentences, i.e. basic sentences that obey the syntactic frames of the prime, must be 
our guide in testing for the existence of that prime in a given language.  
 
3.3 Dalabon 
 
3.3.1 Morphological vs. semantic complexity and the issue of “resonance”  
Dalabon is a Gunwinyguan language spoken in Arnhem Land, Australia. Unlike in 
the previous two cases, Evans (2007, 2010) explicitly presents this case as a 
counterexample to the universality of the KNOW (and THINK) primes, stating that 
“neither ‘think’ nor ‘know’ should be treated as semantic primitives in Dalabon” (p. 
91), and that “there are no verbs that exactly represent 'think' or 'know'” in the 
language (p. 92). The central thread of Evans’ (2007) challenge is as follows: 
because the most obvious candidates for the Dalabon exponents of KNOW and THINK, 
bengkan and bengdi, are built up from a bound root √beng (which, according to 
Evans, is the equivalent of English ‘mind’; p. 76) it is mistaken to regard Dalabon 
as having semantically unanalysable exponents of the KNOW and THINK primes. 
Instead, Evans argues, it is the root √beng that should be taken as conceptually 
primitive in Dalabon. I will first assess this idea, given that it is the main argument 
in the paper, before dealing with two further issues that arise from Evans (2007, 
2010) discussion of bengkan, related to the possible polysemy of the concept 
(§3.3.2). 
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The main line of evidence Evans offers in support of his analysis that √beng 
is conceptually basic is the existence of a range of meanings that are built on this 
root, not only bengkan and bengdi but other broadly “cognitive” concepts, such as 
benghbengkan (‘recognise, identify’), bengyihbon (‘pay attention’) and 
bengwudjmú (‘(neglectfully) forget about’). The idea seems to be that the existence 
of a wide variety of cognitive concepts that are based on √beng constitutes evidence 
for this root playing a pivotal role in the Dalabon conception of the cognitive 
domain, and thus it is via √beng that bengkan (‘know’) and bengdi (‘think’) must 
be understood. Evans (2007) thus uses morphological features of Dalabon cognitive 
verbs to argue for a semantic analysis of the concepts they stand for. 
Goddard & Wierzbicka’s (2014b: 16ff) respond in some detail to this 
challenge. The main thrust of their argument is that contra Evans, we cannot be 
guided by language-specific morphology in our assessment of whether a language 
has distinct exponents of the NSM primes. This position might be summed up by 
the dictum “morphological complexity does not entail semantic complexity”. That 
is, the fact that a lexeme is made up of formally divisible elements is not sufficient 
evidence for its conceptual complexity. Thus for example, the fact that the English 
exponent SOMEONE appears to have formally distinguishable elements, ‘some’ and 
‘one’, does not show that it is semantically decomposable in terms of them, nor does 
it constitute evidence for the conceptual basicness of these smaller elements. It is 
important to understand what would, on the NSM hypothesis, show that ‘someone’ 
is conceptually complex and composed of semantic primitives ‘some’ and ‘one’. 
The answer: an adequate definition of ‘someone’ in terms of the elements ‘some’ 
and ‘one’, in addition to evidence showing that ‘some’ and ‘one’ (and any other 
elements appearing in the proposed definition) are wholly cross-translatable. Absent 
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such an analysis, and on the grounds that SOMEONE has so far been found to be cross-
translatable, it is taken an NSM prime, and the ‘some’ and ‘one’ elements that 
appear in the English exponent are deemed to be (semantically) irrelevant. 
What is also crucial about this response is that it doesn’t deny that speakers 
may notice when two or more primes share part of their morphological form, and 
may consequently judge there to be a certain connection between the concepts. This 
is an example of what is called resonance in the NSM literature, which broadly 
describes the ways in which exponents of a prime can “feel” different in different 
languages, whether due to their form or to local polysemies (Wierzbicka 1996: 30; 
Goddard & Wierzbicka 1994: 35f). Thus just as the exponents SOMEONE and 
SOMETHING have a certain resonance for English speakers because of the shared 
element ‘some’, so Dalabon speakers may feel that there is a similarity between 
bengkan and bengdi, on account of their common root. But the idea is that such 
matters are not strictly semantic, just as the feeling of relatedness we may get from 
two words that rhyme is explained by their shared phonological features, and has 
nothing to do with their meanings. In the case of shared morphological form, 
however, the feeling of resonance may lead us to the intuition that the concepts are 
interdefinable, or that they are both definable in terms of the shared element plus 
other material. From the NSM point of view, however, this intuition is mistaken. 
And it is mistaken simply because there is no reductive and fully cross-translatable 
way of explaining the meaning of ‘someone’ and ‘something’ in terms of ‘some’ 
plus other material, nor, it is hypothesised, the meaning of bengkan and bengdi in 
terms of √beng.  
I believe this is a satisfactory answer to why the presence of √beng in two 
Dalabon exponents, bengkan and bengdi is not an issue for the distinctness of the 
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KNOW and THINK primes in this language. That said, I do think much more needs to 
be said on the issue of resonance. In particular, it seems to me that we need richer 
answers to questions about the significance of local polysemies and about cases of 
shared morphological form of two or more primes. If such similarities are not 
indicative of compositional semantic relationships, why do they happen? Are there 
similar types of morphological complexity of the primes found across languages, 
and if so, what do such typological facts tell us? It seems to me that even if we agree 
that language-specific polysemy or formal complexity cannot steer semantic 
analysis, answering such questions is important and interesting.  
 
3.3.2 Two further challenges: polysemy of bengkan? 
But it seems to me that Evans (2007) has another reason for claiming that in Dalabon 
“there are no verbs that exactly represent ‘think’ or ‘know’” (p. 92), namely the fact 
that both bengkan and bengdi each appear to have a wide range of meanings (i.e. 
beyond that of ‘know’ and ‘think’), some of which seem to partially overlap. For 
example, Evans lists ‘remember’, and ‘think’ as other possible translations of 
bengkan, and ‘attend to’ and ‘remember’ as additional meanings bengdi (p. 73). In 
this section, I aim to show why this polysemy, if such it is, is unproblematic for the 
claim that bengkan is the Dalabon exponent of KNOW. First let’s consider some of 
Evans’ (2007) examples of bengkan in its ‘know’ capacity: 
 
(9) Nunh  ngah-dja-bengka-n, mak  nga-bengmukm-iyam,  
DEM  1-just-keep.in.mind-PR  NEG  1-forget-F 
mak  nga-bengmukm-ú,  ngah-dja-yidjnja-n  kanum-ngan-kah. 
NEG 1-forget-PR  1/3-just-have-PR  ear-1SGPoss-LOC 
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‘I still know that, I haven’t forgotten. I still hold it in my memory / in my mind’ 
(lit. ‘in my ear’) (p. 78). 
 
(10) Mak nunh keninjh      burra.bengka-n                barrah-bomung,     
NEG DEM what      3DU/3-keep.in.mind-PR   3DU-be.ignorant  
burrah-karrú-warhwa-n. 
3du/3-culture-not.have.in.mind-P 
‘…they don’t know anything, they are forgetting their culture’ (p. 87). 
 
Interestingly, though Evans glosses bengkan as ‘keep in mind’ (in keeping with his 
analysis that √beng is a semantically primitive concept in Dalabon), he translates it 
as ‘know’ in each case here. As Goddard & Wierzbicka (2014b:17f) argue, it is 
unclear why ‘keep in mind’ should be preferred over ‘know’ in such cases.37 
Nevertheless, there are other uses of the word that appear to be quite different, such 
as some examples that Evans translates as ‘remember’ (2007: 88): 
 
(11) Nunh          ngah-dja-bengka-n,         mak   nga-bengmukm-iyan,    
 DEM            1/3-just-keep.in.mind-PR              NEG    1/3-forget-F  
mak             nga- bengmukm-û. 
NEG             1/3-forget-PR  
‘I still remember his face, I’ll never forget it.’ 
 
(12)  Ngah-die-bukirribo-ng   bah      kodj-ngan-kah       ngah-dja-bengka-n       
  1/3-face-dream-P  but       head-1SG.Poss-LOC     1/3-just-keep.in.mind-PR    
 
                                                
37 Of course, Evans (2007) would cite the morphology of the verb as the reason (the element -kan derives from a word 
meaning ‘carry’, suggesting to Evans that bengkan has a meaning like ‘carry in mind’), but as I have argued, the issue is 
why we should take etymological analysis as informative on semantic facts. 
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mak    nga-kodj-mukmu. 
NEG   1-head-be.buried 
‘I saw a face when I woke up and I keep thinking about it / keep remembering 
it, I can’t forget the face.’ 
 
Goddard & Wierzbicka (2014b: 18) argue that there isn’t good evidence for bengkan 
having a distinct sense of ‘remember’, suggesting that an alternative translation of 
(11), “I still know his face. I’ll never forget it”, works just as well. I am not sure this 
is satisfactory, given that the contrast with ‘forget’ in both (11) and (12) suggests to 
me that there may be extra semantic content here, more than just KNOW (perhaps 
involving a component like ‘I am thinking about it (=his face)’). Furthermore, I am 
unsure whether it generally makes sense (in English at least) to talk of “still 
knowing”, in the sense of continuing to know something, which seems to be the 
sense conveyed by (11). Perhaps, then, bengkan is genuinely polysemous, contra 
Goddard & Wierzbicka (2014b), having a meaning somewhat similar to English 
‘remember’ (the explication of which involves both KNOW and THINK, see 
Wierzbicka 2007). But what must be understood is that this does not present a 
problem for the hypothesis that Dalabon has a distinct exponent of the KNOW prime. 
Of course, bengkan having other meanings than those ascribed to the KNOW prime 
is important for Dalabon-specific semantic analysis, and identifying these other 
meanings would require detailed semantic investigation. But the point is that no 
number of possible polysemies of bengkan can affect the claim that this form should 
be considered the Dalabon exponent of KNOW, provided the meanings can be 
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distinguished, by using the canonical sentences to isolate the prime, as well as the 
standard tests of polysemy discussed in §1.2.38 
There is one final challenge to address, hinted at in Evans (2007) and alluded 
to again in his (2010): the idea that bengkan can also mean ‘think’, and thus that the 
concepts ‘know’ and ‘think’ are not discrete in Dalabon. Specifically, Evans claims 
that bengkan “covers both ‘know’ and ‘think’, with the exact sense coloured by 
aspect and context” (2010: 516). In his original study of (2007), however, though 
‘think’ is listed as one of the possible glosses of bengkan (pp. 73, 77), there is only 
one example presented where it is actually translated as such, viz. example (12) 
above. However, it isn’t clear that ‘think’ is the best translation here, given that both 
‘keep thinking about it’ and ‘keep remembering it’ are offered in Evans’ free 
translations. Without clearer examples, I don’t see cause to worry about the 
distinctness of THINK or KNOW primes. And note that if, as I suggested in relation to 
example (11), there is another meaning of bengkan that is akin to English 
‘remember’, then (12) could just as well be taken as instantiating that complex 
meaning, and not as an instance of the prime KNOW, nor indeed, of THINK. 
 
3.4 East Cree 
Junker’s (2008) analysis of East Cree, an Algonquian language spoken in Quebec, 
presents a possible challenge for the identification of the KNOW prime, analogous to 
the case of Dalabon. But unlike in the case of Evans (2007), Junker (2008) does not 
see the matter as showing that East Cree has no exponent of KNOW. The issue, then, 
involves the fact that East Cree has a verbal element occurring in all the East Cree 
                                                
38 Space does not permit me to discuss bengdi, but the same goes for any additional meanings that this lexeme may be 
shown to have. 
 37 
 
exponents of the mental predicate primes, THINK, WANT and KNOW, which might call 
into question whether such concepts are truly conceptually basic in this language. 
Consider the following East Cree exponents of the mental predicate primes (from 
Junker 2003: 181): 
Table 3. Mental predicate primes in East Cree (intransitive/transitive pairs) 
THINK ITEYIHTAM/ITEYIMEU   
WANT NITUWEYIHTAM/NITUWEYIMEU 
KNOW CHISCHEYIHTAM/CHISCHEYI-EU 
 
As underlined above, the exponents of East Cree mental predicates all contain the 
morpheme -eyi-, which Junker describes as “act[ing] like a classifier of mental 
activities” (p. 182). Nevertheless, according to Junker (2003: 181), speakers “refuse 
to decompose” the above forms, supporting the idea that they are semantically 
primitive. And Junker (2008) actually cites canonical sentences of the primes, such 
as ‘Ekun ka iteyihtahk: “…”’ (‘X thought like this: “…”’), ‘Chinituweyimitin’ (‘I 
want you to do it’), and Nichischeyihten (‘I know it’), which shows the distinctness 
of these meanings in the East Cree language. 
However, there is one prima facie puzzling finding made by Junker (2003). 
In surveying East Cree speakers about the meaning of verbs containing -eyi- (of 
which there are many more than the three exponents above), she found that all 
speakers “agreed that some element of iteyimuu ‘she/he is thinking’ […] is involved 
in all the -eyi- verbs”, including the exponents of KNOW, WANT and FEEL (2003: 182). 
What are we to conclude from this seemingly contradictory finding? How is it that 
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East Cree speakers both refused to separate the morphological elements of 
chischeyihtam (KNOW) etc., and consented to the idea that all -eyi- verbs contain a 
‘thinking’ component? But I would argue that this is unsurprising. Assuming Junker 
obtained the latter information via direct elicitation– i.e. by simply asking speakers 
whether they agreed that an element of ‘thinking’ (iteyimuu) was involved in verbs 
containing -eyi- – then this intuition of East Cree speakers finding can be explained 
by resonance. That is, the presence of the -eyi- morpheme in chischeyihtam, 
iteyimuu and nituweyimeu creates a resonance effect for East Cree speakers, leading 
them to express the belief that a semantic relationship holds between them, despite 
the fact that they are unwilling to separate out the relevant morpheme when 
presented with it in situ.  
 
3.5 Kalam 
 
3.5.1 A more “general” mental predicate? 
The final case I will consider is that of Kalam, a Trans–New Guinean language 
spoken in the Western Highlands Province of Papua New Guinea and analysed by 
Pawley (1994). Similar to Evans (2007) claim about Dalabon, this case represents a 
“classic” challenge to the discreteness of more than one prime. Pawley claims that 
the verbal stem (nŋ-) has a “more general” meaning than three NSM primes: KNOW, 
THINK and FEEL (p. 392). He argues that nŋ- should instead be seen as “denoting 
awareness, conscious perceiving, that is, both sensing and cognising, in which the 
perceiver is (at least partly) in control, or at least is a wilful actor” (loc. cit.). Because 
of the complexity of this case, I will first set out Pawley’s (1994) analysis and the 
evidence he cites in support of it, then show why I think the data doesn’t support 
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Pawley’s conclusion. However, I then argue that in light of the additions of the 
primes SEE and HEAR to the NSM inventory, Kalam nŋ- does in fact present an issue 
for the discreteness of KNOW, which I suggest requires further and possibly 
somewhat novel testing to resolve. 
To see why Pawley argues for his analysis, let us first consider the examples of 
nŋ- expressing what he dubs “the most common senses of the English verb know” 
(1994: 394): 
 
(13) (Tp)   mdp        nŋbin. 
(place)   he.stays    I.know 
‘I know (the place) where he is’ 
 
(14) Cn   tap      kun    ak    tap       tmey   ak      nŋbun. 
we  thing   such  this  thing    bad     this    we.know 
‘We know that this sort of thing is bad’ 
 
(15) B          nb        ak     kuj        tmel       ak     ngak39         ak … 
man    such     this   magic    strong    the   he.knew       the 
‘This man knew very powerful magic …’  
 
The problem, according to Pawley, lies in the fact that these are not the only uses of 
this morpheme. In support of his analysis that nŋ- means something more general 
than KNOW, THINK and FEEL, Pawley offers a range of examples in which nŋ- is 
translated into English with a variety of ostensibly very different meanings, for 
example (1994: 392f): 
                                                
39 This is a variant of nŋ- of the Ti Mnm dialect (Pawley 1994: 392). 
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(16) Kaj  kuy  nŋbin. 
pig  odour  I. perceive 
‘I smell pork’ 
 
(17) Kuj  nŋ-i  cp nagngayn. 
magic learn-SS:PRIOR victim I.will.kill 
‘I will learn/acquire knowledge of magic and kill people’ 
 
(18) Apan    ma-nŋbin,       mnm-nad   apan. 
you.have.said not-I.know      language-your you-have.spoken 
‘I didn’t understand what you said, you spoke in your own language.’ 
 
(19) Tmuk        agek nŋbin. 
thunder     it.sounds I.perceived 
‘I heard thunder’ 
  
(20) Kotop-yp  enen  m-ap         nŋban? 
house-my why not-come    you.see 
‘Why haven’t you come to see my house?’ 
 
In addition, Pawley also points to the fact that Kalam has a range of lexicalised 
phrases involving nŋ-: including wsn nŋ- ‘dream’ (lit. ‘sleep perceive’), tumd nŋ- 
‘hear’ (lit. ‘ear perceive’) and wdn nŋ- ‘see’ (lit. ‘eye perceive’) (p. 393). For 
Pawley, the existences of such complex forms, with such a variety of cognitive and 
sensory meanings, supports the idea that nŋ- has a more general meaning than that 
proposed for the NSM prime KNOW. But particularly problematic, according to 
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Pawley, is the complex form gos nŋ-, which is the most ready translation of English 
‘think’ and is thus the most obvious candidate for the Kalam exponent of the prime 
THINK (1994: 394): 
 
(21)   Gos         nŋl   agak     ypd          mdeb       
  thought     having.perceived he.said     straight   it.was  
  agl        knak. 
  having.decided       he.slept 
‘Only when he thought everything was in order did he sleep.’ 
 
If (21) is judged to be just one use of a unitary concept represented by nŋ-, then 
obviously the discreteness of the exponents of THINK and KNOW looks to be in 
jeopardy.  
And what about the uses of nŋ- that present a problem for the idea that Kalam 
has a distinct exponent of FEEL? Pawley cites only one sentence with nŋ- where the 
translation involves English ‘feel’, as follows (p. 393): 
 
(22)  np  mapn  nŋbin 
 you liver l.feel 
‘I feel sorry/affection for you’ 
 
Again, if this example is understood as an instantiation of the prime FEEL, rather 
than an extended meaning of the nŋ- verb, then this would present a problem for the 
NSM proposal that the FEEL and KNOW primes represent universally distinct 
concepts.  
 42 
 
On the basis of evidence presented here, Pawley summarises what he 
considers to be the problem with establishing the existence of Kalam exponents of 
the mental predicates, KNOW, THINK, and FEEL, saying that it is “not that Kalam does 
not have specific translation equivalents of KNOW, THINK and FEEL, but rather that 
these notions are aspects of a more general concept” (p. 393).  
 
3.5.2 Responding to Pawley 
What can we conclude from Pawley’s (1994) study of Kalam about the 
universality and discreteness of the KNOW, THINK, and FEEL primes? It will be easiest 
to first consider the identification of Kalam exponents for THINK and FEEL, before 
addressing the question of whether nŋ- can legitimately be regarded as the Kalam 
exponent of KNOW. As far as THINK is concerned, we saw above that Kalam has a 
complex form gos nŋ-, which appears to be only ever translated into English as 
‘think’ (Pawley 1994: 394f). As Wierzbicka (1994a: 455) argues in her response to 
Pawley (1994), there is no reason, then, not to take this complex form as the Kalam 
exponent of THINK. Just as in the case of Dalabon, morphological complexity cannot 
be taken as equivalent to semantic complexity, so the fact that the nŋ- stem is found 
in gos nŋ- is no reason to treat the morpheme as independently meaningful in this 
context, in the sense of having its own paraphrasable semantic content.40 In fact, 
there is some positive support of the hypothesis that gos nŋ- is distinct from nŋ- in 
the fact that one can translate the contrastive sentence “I think (p) but I don’t know”, 
where gos nŋ- is used for ‘think’, and nŋ- for ‘know’ (Pawley, cited in Wierzbicka 
1994a: 455f). And note that just as in the case of Dalabon, we need not deny that 
                                                
40 Note, however, that the examples of gos nŋ- offered by Pawley do not look particularly close to the canonical sentences 
for THINK currently proposed for the prime, so (as ever) further testing is required. 
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Kalam speakers may be aware of the similarity between gos nŋ- and nŋ-, a 
phenomenon that is explicable in terms of resonance (§3.3.1). 
As for FEEL, Pawley similarly provides only one example where nŋ- is 
translated as ‘feel’, namely (22) above. However, (22) is a quite clearly language-
specific emotion expression,41 and is far from being a canonical sentence for FEEL. 
Thus this sentence cannot be regarded as a test for the Kalam exponent of FEEL (or 
indeed, of KNOW). And as we have seen, it is not problematic if the exponent of a 
prime has additional, language-specific meanings, even if the explications of those 
meanings involve other primes. Consider that English ‘feel’ is sometimes used to 
mean something much closer to ‘think’, as in “I feel (that) he is a poor leader”; both 
THINK and FEEL would probably figure in the explication of this sense of the word. 
Just as this English-specific polysemy does threaten the discreteness of the English 
exponents THINK and FEEL, so the use of nŋ- in an emotion construction like (22) 
does not affect whether this morpheme cannot also be considered the Kalam 
exponent of KNOW. Moreover, note that nŋ- is not actually among the verb stems 
that Pawley discusses when considering possible candidates for the prime FEEL 
(1994: 396). Thus I would argue that we don’t have reason to consider sentences 
like (22) to bear on the existence of Kalam counterparts of KNOW and FEEL.  
 
If it is right that nŋ- is not the exponent of either THINK or FEEL, does this 
mean it can be considered the legitimate Kalam exponent of KNOW? As mentioned 
at the beginning of the section, I think this proposal does hit a snag, in light of the 
introduction of the experiential primes SEE and HEAR. But before I outline this 
problem, it is worth clarifying that the additional (non-prime) meanings of nŋ-, like 
                                                
41 Consider that English has no emotion term befitting an admixture of ‘feeling sorry’ and ‘affection’. 
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‘smell’ and ‘learn/acquire knowledge’, seen in sentences (16) and (17), shouldn’t 
be deemed problematic. As I have already argued, language-specific polysemy 
involving an exponent of a prime is not an issue, provided that the additional 
meanings can be pinpointed and given an adequate analysis via NSM explication. 
Thus as long as meanings such as that in (16), where nŋ- is translated as ‘smell’ can 
be explained in terms of primes (no doubt including nŋ-), then the proposal that 
Kalam has a discrete exponent of KNOW prime can be sustained. As to exactly what 
and how many additional semantically complex meanings Kalam nŋ- has, this 
requires detailed semantic analysis to establish, which remains to be conducted. 
Similarly, the array of complex forms nŋ- appears in, such as wsn nŋ- 
(‘dream’, lit. ‘sleep nŋ-’) doesn’t present difficulties. If the response given in the 
cases of Dalabon bengkan and Kalam gos nŋ- are correct, namely that 
morphological analysability does not necessarily entail semantic analysability, then 
there is no reason to regard the existence of a form like wsn nŋ- (‘dream’) as bearing 
on the question of whether nŋ- is the proper exponent of KNOW. Note, however, that 
wdn nŋ- ‘see’ (lit. ‘eye nŋ-’), and tumd nŋ- ‘hear’ (lit. ‘ear nŋ-’) look to be the best 
candidates for the more recently introduced primes SEE and HEAR (neither of which 
were part of the NSM inventory at that time), and as such, these particular complex 
forms need to be posited as semantically unanalysable phrasemes, on par with gos 
nŋ-. But once again, several primes sharing one morphological root is unproblematic 
in principle, and there is no more an issue with regarding wdn nŋ- as the Kalam 
exponent of SEE, and tumd nŋ- the exponent of HEAR, as there is with regarding gos 
nŋ- as instantiating the prime THINK. 
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3.5.3 “Interprime” polysemy of nŋ-? 
However, I do think there is a residual issue with Kalam nŋ-. The problem I see is 
with examples such as (19) and (20), where nŋ- alone (i.e. not as part of a complex 
form) is translated as ‘see’ and ‘hear’, viz. the meanings of two other NSM primes. 
Note that neither example has any disambiguating material besides the nature of the 
object of perception (e.g. ‘thunder’, a paradigmatic example of something heard). 
Further, note that the entries in the English-Kalam dictionary (Pawley 2011) list 
both nŋ- and tumd nŋ- as translations of ‘hear’ and both nŋ- and wdn nŋ- for ‘see’, 
with the plain nŋ- stem actually being listed first for both entries.  
This may be a case of “interprime polysemy”, i.e., a case in which two or 
more primes are instantiated by the same word in a given language. But why is this 
a problem? After all, we have seen that language-specific polysemy of an exponent 
should never be regarded as an objection to the prime, provided that the different 
meanings can be distinguished by standard tests, e.g. identifying disambiguating 
grammatical contexts. This should be no different in the case of primes, in which 
their syntactic frames can do the job of disambiguation. That is, all that should be 
required is that the lexical form appearing in the syntactic framex can only have the 
meaning ascribed to PRIMEx, whereas its appearance in the syntactic framey forces a 
different meaning, namely that of PRIMEy.42  
However, in this case such disambiguation is less straightforward. For while 
KNOW, HEAR and SEE do each have their own set of syntactic frames (Goddard 2008: 
72ff), in virtue of being in the same “category” of mental/experiential primes they 
also share one frame, namely ‘X       SOMETHING’ (‘I know something’, ‘I saw 
something’ and ‘I heard something’). Thus in the Kalam sentence (yad) tap ebap 
                                                
42 Where the meanings of PRIMEx PRIMEy,etc. are obviously not specifiable by any definition but are established by means 
of cross-checking across languages.  
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nŋbin (‘I nŋ-(ed) something’), nŋ- could instantiate KNOW, SEE or HEAR, with only 
discourse context disambiguating the meaning.43 More generally, the issue is that in 
cases of interprime polysemy involving primes of the same or similar “category”, 
some of their syntactic frames may overlap. 
There are several possible responses to this problem. One is to counter that 
it is sufficient that some of the syntactic frames are uniquely associated with the 
meaning of one prime and are incompatible with the meanings of others. Thus for 
example, it might be reasonable to say that the Kalam translation of the substantive 
topic frame for KNOW (‘I know some things about things like this’) does uniquely 
identify nŋ- in its KNOW capacity, and excludes the SEE and HEAR meanings. I think 
this is part of the right answer, but I do not think it definitively rules out the 
hypothesis that Kalam NŊ- is a single semantic primitive, which has all the 
combinatorial possibilities currently posited for NSM primes KNOW, SEE and HEAR: 
‘X nŋ-(s) something’, ‘X nŋ-(s) something about things like this’, ‘X nŋ-(s) 
something in this place’, and so on. 
Another counterargument is that irrespective of the interprime polysemy, if 
the supposedly more general meaning of nŋ-, covering KNOW, HEAR and SEE 
meanings, cannot be stated in a reductive, cross-linguistically universal paraphrase, 
then Pawley’s proposal cannot get off the ground (à la Wierzbicka 1994a: 456). On 
the NSM view, comparison with other languages is the yardstick of any prime claim, 
so if an equivalent of nŋ- does not exist in other languages, and if there is no way of 
defining it a way that could be explained in all other languages, then the proposal 
that nŋ- means something more general than KNOW, HEAR, and SEE falls flat. 
Ultimately, this is an assumption of the theory, which may not be accepted by those 
                                                
43 (Andrew Pawley, personal communication, 13 May 2016). 
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who aren’t already sympathetic to the NSM project. But note that it is an assumption 
that makes sense if we take the psychological view of NSM seriously. That is, if the 
NSM primes are essentially the “atoms of thought”, part of cognitive apparatus 
shared by all human beings, it is implausible to suppose that Kalam has an 
unanalysable perceptual predicate more general in meaning the concepts used by 
speakers of all other languages. 
 Nevertheless, my suggestion to resolve the issue of Kalam nŋ- involves 
embracing the idea that certain hard cases of polysemy may require investigation 
into speakers’ semantic representations beyond standard tests of polysemy and other 
language-internal tests. That is, I think this is a case which might benefit from the 
kind of wider behavioural experiments pointed to in §1.3. One possibility that I think 
could be testable in this way is that nŋ- in (19) is actually understood by Kalam 
speakers as an elliptical form of tumd nŋ- (‘hear’), and similarly that nŋ- in (20) is 
elliptical for wsn nŋ- (‘see’). What would support such an analysis would be if native 
speakers automatically interpreted (yad) tap ebap nŋbin (‘I nŋ-(ed) something’), 
when uttered out of context, as ‘I know something’, with only the ‘hear’ and ‘see’ 
meanings being possible when situated in contexts that would make that meaning 
obvious (such as by earlier reference to thunder). Assuming it were practicable, I 
suggest that this is the very sort of case in which a controlled experiment designed 
to test speaker intuitions would be helpful. In the meantime, those sympathetic to 
the KNOW hypothesis should take a bet that such testing would bear out the 
hypothesis that the primes KNOW, SEE and HEAR are just as distinct for Kalam 
speakers as they are for speakers of other languages. Absent plausible 
counterexamples from other languages, it would be unreasonable to abandon the 
hypothesis that KNOW is a universal and primitive concept on this (underexamined) 
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case alone. In fact, this bet about the distinctness of these primes in Kalam despite 
their identical lexical form is theoretically valuable; it amounts to NSM having some 
“predictive power”. 
 
3.6 Other unresolved issues 
As may be expected, various smaller outstanding issues relating to the 
exponents of KNOW in other languages that have emerged during NSM research, 
which require further data or analysis to be resolved. I will give one example here, 
from the Austronesian language, Mangaaba-Mbula, as analysed by Bugenhagen 
(2002). Bugenhagen argues that there is a problem with the syntactic frame ‘X 
knows something about something/someone’ in this language, going as far as to say 
that “it is not possible […] to construct a trivalent sentence of this type with the 
exponent of KNOW” (2002: 12f). In his discussion, he points to Stanwood’s (1997) 
study on the NSM exponents in Hawaiian Creole English, stating that Stanwood 
found this syntactic frame to be “problematic” in this language, and thus that the 
trivalent option for KNOW may need to be eliminated altogether from the 
combinatorial possibilities posited for the prime. Looking more closely at 
Stanwood’s (1997) study, however, we see that he does not claim that this valency 
option is “problematic”, but rather notes that it is not well-attested, given that his 
corpus contained only one example (1997: 212), as follows: 
 
(23) Daets wai in da mil, dei sei .... Wel, ai dono mach abaut mil.  
 That's why in the mill, they say .... Well, I don't know much about the mill. 
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The trivalent valency option is a productive syntactic frame in NSM explications, 
so should not be discarded without good reason. Ideally, then, further research 
would be conducted on Mangaaba-Mbula (or nearby languages) to establish 
whether such constructions really are absent.  
Another important and more general issue, mentioned at several points 
throughout this chapter, is that many of the published studies that attest to the 
existence of KNOW in various languages rely on examples that are quite far from the 
recently proposed canonical sentences. A new wave of testing in these languages is 
thus necessary to ensure that the exponents conform to the current combinatorial 
possibilities proposed for KNOW, which, as we have seen, have undergone important 
changes in recent years. 
 
 
Chapter 4. The (un)analysability of ‘know(s)’ in 
analytic epistemology 
 
In the following two chapters, I move from the linguistic part of the thesis to the 
more philosophical side of things. That is, we have so far been concerned with the 
KNOW hypothesis proper; now we will be concerned with the interdisciplinary 
question about how the KNOW prime relates to the philosophical literature on 
know(ledge).44 The present chapter will center on how the semantic unanalysability 
of KNOW – i.e. one half of the claim that a given concept is an NSM prime – relates 
                                                
44 As we will see, while epistemologists often talk about about ‘theories of knowledge’ they are typically focussed on 
the application of the word ‘know(s)’, hence this notation. 
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to approaches to analysing knowledge in analytic epistemology.45 Chapter 5 will 
focus on the other half of the NSM claim about KNOW, viz. its universality, 
considering whether it is threatened by the “experimental philosophy” findings of 
Weinberg et al. (2001), which appear to show that there is cultural variation in 
epistemic intuitions. 
More specifically, the present chapter concentrates on Williamson’s (2000) 
knowledge-first thesis, which is essentially a rejection of the analytic project46 in 
analytic epistemology. The analytic project refers to the attempt to reductively 
define the concept of knowledge; Williamson’s (2000) knowledge-first thesis 
directly challenges this project, proposing instead that ‘know(s)’ is both 
conceptually irreducible and psychologically fundamental. Such a view is obviously 
strongly reminiscent of the claim that KNOW, as an NSM prime, represents a 
semantically (and psychologically, on the version of NSM I am defending) basic 
concept. The purpose of the chapter is to consider in what ways the two positions 
relate.  
 
4.1 Williamson’s knowledge-first thesis 
 
4.1.1 Background: The analytic project and the Gettier challenge 
But in order to get a grip on Williamson’s knowledge-first thesis, we must first 
introduce both the analytic project and the (in)famous Gettier problem that 
challenged the (now ex-)standard analysis of knowledge as “justified, true belief”.  
The analytic project, then, is one of the central concerns of traditional epistemology 
                                                
45 I will be confined to discussion of philosophy in the analytic tradition, but this is not to say that continental philosophers 
haven’t been just as engaged with epistemological questions (see Alcoff (1992) for an insightful introduction to 
continental epistemology). 
46 Term due to Duncan Pritchard (2009). 
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(Stich 1990:2), the aim of which is to find an adequate analysis of the concept of 
knowledge in terms of other (putatively more basic) notions, such as truth, 
justification, and reliability. More precisely, contemporary epistemologists aim to 
isolate the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge attribution, that is, the 
conditions governing felicitous uses of the word ‘know(s)’, especially in a 
propositional knowledge context, as in sentences of the form ‘S knows that p’, 
where S is a subject, and p a given proposition.  
The earliest analysis of this kind – a version of which is thought to be 
traceable to Plato – is the justified true belief account (JTB for short).47 On this, the 
once standard account of knowledge, S counts as knowing p if and only if the 
following three conditions hold: 1) S believes p; 2) p is true; and 3) S has some sort 
of “justification” for believing p (traditionally conceived of as something internal 
to the knower, such as having a good reason for thinking p is true)48. Such an 
analysis is supposed to be an account of when speakers utter (truly) sentences like 
‘John knows (that) the capital of Norway is Oslo’ and ‘Lilian knows (that) there are 
two jewellers in town’. Until the latter half of the twentieth century, such a 
conception of knowledge was apparently widely accepted among analytic 
philosophers, with specific analyses of ‘knows’ loosely following a JTB model, 
such as those offered by Ayer (1956) and by Chisholm (1957).49  
But then came Gettier. As McGlynn (2014) writes, with just a little tongue-
in-cheek: “philosophers rested content with the JTB account for […] 2500 years, 
until two-and-a-half pages published in Analysis in 1963 changed everything.” How 
                                                
47 According to Ichikawa & Steup (2014), “Socrates articulates the need for something like a justification condition in 
Plato's Theaetetus, when he points out that ‘true opinion’ is in general insufficient for knowledge”. However, it is natural 
to wonder whether our concept of ‘justification’ really corresponds to whatever Plato, as an Attic Greek speaker, had in 
mind. 
48 There are various ways of conceiving of the justification condition, e.g. on Ayer’s analysis, arguably a version of JTB, 
it is conceived of as the subject having “a right to be sure” that p is true (1956: 28-34). 
49 But cf. McGlynn (2014: ch. 1) on the idea that the received view that JTB was the standard analysis of knowledge 
drastically oversimplifies the matter. 
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did Gettier achieve such a feat? Essentially, he presented several counterexamples 
to the sufficiency of the JTB analysis, i.e. cases in which a subject has a justified and 
true belief, and yet it doesn’t seem right to say she knows the proposition.50 Consider 
the following Gettier-style counterexample:51 
 
(1) The Ford 
Smith and Nogot work in the same office. Smith believes Nogot owns a Ford: 
Nogot, who has previously proved trustworthy, told Smith that he owns a Ford, 
and has just given Smith a ride in a Ford. From this evidence Smith infers the 
proposition: Someone in the office owns a Ford. Unbeknownst to Smith, however, 
Nogot has recently sold his Ford and is currently driving a rented car. But the 
proposition is true, because another person in the office, Mr. Havit, happens to own 
a Ford. Does Smith know that someone in the office owns a Ford?” 
 
Smith believes the proposition that someone in the office owns a Ford. His belief is 
justified because Nogot gave him a ride in a Ford, typically as good a reason as any 
to believe someone owns a certain car. His belief is true because although Nogot no 
longer owns a Ford, Mr Havit, who also works in the office, does own one. Yet it 
doesn’t seem right to say that Smith knows that someone in the office owns a Ford, 
notwithstanding his justified and true belief. Such cases are called Gettier-style 
counterexamples, or simply Gettier cases, and the intuition that they are not 
instances of knowledge is called the Gettier intuition. The defining characteristic of 
a Gettier case is just that the subject has a belief that is sufficiently justified by 
                                                
50 Note that the referent of ‘us’ is a matter of debate. The majority of Anglo analytic philosophers have this intuition, but 
they also assume is that it extends to ordinary speakers as well. Whether or not the Gettier intuition is in fact shared by 
ordinary English speakers, let alone speakers of other languages, is questioned by experimental philosophers (see 
Chapter 5).   
51 (1) is adapted from Lehrer (1965).  
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ordinary standards (i.e. most people would consider it a reasonable belief to hold), 
yet it is only true by some sort of luck (Zagzebski 1994). In other words, the factor 
that makes the belief justified and the factor that makes it true come apart. And if 
this is right, then JTB cannot be an adequate analysis of the concept of 
(propositional) knowledge. Of course, it is still possible that some or all of the 
elements (truth, justification, belief) are individually necessary components of a 
proper analysis of ‘knowing that’, but if Gettier intuition is correct, then they are at 
least not jointly sufficient. 
It is no exaggeration to say that a whole philosophical literature was 
generated in the wake of Gettier (1963), consisting in attempts to improve upon the 
JTB account in light of Gettier cases, as well as the proposal of novel Gettier-style 
counterexamples,52 which led to yet further analyses to try to account for them.53 As 
McGlynn (2014) puts it, Gettier “triggered 50 years of ingenious, sophisticated, and 
often ridiculously complicated attempts to identify the mystery factor X that would 
result in knowledge when added to justified true belief (or alternatively, when 
replacing justification)”.  
 
4.1.2 Williamson (2000) on the irreducibility of 'know(s)’ 
It is fair to say that Williamson's (2000) knowledge-first thesis (henceforth KF) 
turns the traditional analytic project in epistemology quite completely on its head. 
It is essentially the idea that instead of trying to understand knowledge in terms of 
other notions or principles – whether it is the notions of truth and justification, or 
                                                
52 e.g. the Ginet-Goldman fake barn cases (Goldman 1976) (see Hetherington (1999) and Starmans and Friedman (2013: 
663) on the difference between barn cases and standard Gettier cases). 
53 For example, Nozick (1981) tries to account for fake barn cases (see above note) under his reliabilist account of 
knowledge, and Kripke (2011) critique’s Nozick’s analysis, generating further Gettier-like counterexamples in the 
process. 
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modal principles like sensitivity54 – our theory of knowledge should put knowledge 
first. KF properly incorporates two claims, one conceptual, another metaphysical, 
but we will concentrate on the conceptual part of the thesis here, as it is this claim 
that bares closest affinity with the NSM hypothesis that KNOW is a semantic prime.55 
The conceptual claim, then, is that ‘know(s)’ is a fundamental concept and thus 
cannot be analysed in terms of more basic concepts, contra the traditional analytic 
project, which tries to do just that.56 This is a direct attack on all conceptual analyses 
or definitions of knowledge both pre- and post-Gettier, whether it is Ayer’s (1956) 
essentially JTB account, or Pritchard’s (2005, 2009) anti-luck epistemology. 
As is not unusual in the more traditional corners of analytic philosophy, 
Williamson’s thesis on the primeness of knowing is not based on empirical 
investigation. So what arguments does he put forward for the view? According to 
Cassam’s (2009) helpful analysis, Williamson offers essentially three lines of 
argument for the indefinability of ‘knows’: 1) the inductive argument, 2) the distinct 
concepts argument and 3) the argument from false expectations. I will discuss these 
in turn. The inductive argument begins with the observation that the post-Gettier 
literature – on the face of it, an endless cycle of analyses, counterexamples and 
reformulations – shows no sign of letting up. On inductive grounds, then, we have 
reason to believe the analytic project will never succeed. In Williamson's words, 
“the pursuit of analyses [of ‘know(s)’] is a degenerating research programme” 
                                                
54 Nozick (1981) defends a sensitivity condition for knowledge, whereby for a subject to know some p, her belief that p 
must be sensitive to changes in its truth (if p were false, she wouldn’t still believe it). 
55 For the curious reader, the metaphysical claim is that knowing is a purely mental state, i.e. it has no non-mental 
properties. This is a controversial view given the “factive” nature of knowing: the fact (as it seems to most philosophers) 
that knowing p entails that p is true, unlike in the case of other mental states, e.g. believing and desiring. Williamson 
argues that purely mental nature of knowing follows from the truth of content externalism, using a parity of reasoning 
argument (see Williamson (2000: 33ff), but cf. Fricker’s (2009) critique). Note that “metaphysical” here means simply 
a claim about what the world is like; plausibly, this claim is actually a psychological one, given Williamson’s repeated 
characterisation of knowing as a mental state. 
56 To be absolutely clear, note that while Williamson (2000) denies that ‘knows’ can be given a standard analysis as 
sought by traditional epistemologists, he does think that a very “thin” account of knowing is possible; namely, it can be 
understood as the most general factive mental state. But this is not in any way intended as a compositional definition or 
analysis of the concept. 
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(2000: 31). The argument from false expectations is something of an extension of 
the inductive argument, essentially the idea that we just shouldn't expect such a 
philosophically important concept as ‘knows’ to be amenable to standard conceptual 
analysis, given that concepts of comparable significance have similarly resisted such 
treatment, notably 'causes' and 'means' (loc. cit.).  
And thirdly, the distinct concepts argument – the most complex of 
Williamson’s arguments for KF – begins with the claim that ‘knows’ is a strictly 
mental concept, the semantic role of which is to denote a mental state, viz. the 
mental state of knowing.57 If this is correct, Williamson argues, then any definition 
of ‘knows’ containing a non-mental component (e.g. ‘true’, ‘justified’) is “incorrect 
as a claim of concept identity” simply because “the analysing concept is distinct 
from the concept to be analysed” (2000: 30). In other words, if ‘knows’ refers to a 
mental state simpliciter (on par with ‘thinks’, for example), then whatever makes it 
distinct from other mental state predicates, it cannot involve the incorporation of 
non-mental features. This means that all typical definitions of knowledge are 
incorrect, because they invariably contain “irredundant non-mental constituents”, 
mostly notably the concept true (p. 30). Of course, as noted by Williamson, such an 
argument wouldn’t apply to an analysis of ‘knows’ containing only mental concepts, 
but because none of the analyses in the literature are of this kind, the distinct 
concepts argument makes a strong case for the KF thesis.  
If the foregoing arguments are right, then the analytic project is doomed: an 
acceptable definition of ‘knows’, one that would be both generally agreed upon and 
resistant to Gettier cases, will never be attained, simply because no such definition 
exists. It is important to note, however, that while Williamson (2000) claims that 
                                                
57 This ties in with Williamson’s metaphysical claim about the knowing (see note 55). 
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the concept ‘knows’ cannot be analysed into more basic concepts, he doesn't think 
that no “reflective understanding” of it is possible (p. 33).58 In particular, a 
proponent of KF needn’t deny that there is something interesting to be said about 
people’s intuitions on when it is appropriate to apply the ‘knows’ predicate to 
subjects, as the responses to Gettier cases would suggest. What a proponent of KF 
must reject is that these intuitions point to the existence of more basic conceptual 
ingredients into which ‘knows’ can be decomposed.  
It is natural to wonder, however, how KF can account for the fact that there 
are certain conditions that feature in all analyses of knowledge, especially the fact 
that virtually all analyses involve both truth and belief elements.59 What could be 
the explanation of this, if not that ‘true’ and ‘believe’ are components of the ‘know’ 
concept? As I take it, Williamson’s view seems to be that both point to non-
compositional “features” of the concept. He explicitly supports the idea that ‘knows’ 
entails ‘true’ in some sense (p. 21); that is, if we can that a subject knows p, then we 
can also say that p is true, viz. Kp à Tp. But despite this “factiveness” of ‘know’, 
Williamson still thinks it is right to say that it is a semantically unanalysable mental 
concept.60 As for how the concept relates to ‘believe’, one idea that Williamson 
floats is that “the area demarcated by the concept knows might be so safely within 
the area demarcated by the concept believes” that one could know by apriori 
reflection that knowing entails believing (p. 44). In other words, it is on account of 
the meaning of ‘believe’ (or more specifically, ‘believe that’) that one might have 
the intuition that knowing entails believing, viz. Kp à Bp. This is an interesting 
                                                
58 And he does think that a very “thin” account of knowledge is possible; see note 56 above. 
59 That is, all analyses of knowledge that I am aware of involve ‘true’. As for ‘believes’, H.A. Pritchard (1950: 86ff) 
presents a view that contrasts ‘knowing’ with ‘believing’, rather than considering the former as entailing latter, which, 
incidentally, seems more in line with the ordinary usage of these terms.  
60 As mentioned in note 55, Williamson has an argument for the idea that the factiveness of ‘know’, a feature that appears 
to point outside the mind, doesn’t threaten the strict mental status of knowing. 
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suggestion, and from an NSM point of view is much more plausible than the idea 
that ‘know’ contains the notion of ‘believe’, given that the latter concept is not cross-
linguistically universal so could hardly be a component of the universal prime KNOW 
(see §5.2.2).61 I will return to this issue of such entailment intuitions in §4.3, where 
I suggest that, in the case of ‘knowing’ and ‘true’, NSM provides the means for 
actually testing the possible entailment. 
 
4.2 Comparing approaches: Knowledge-first and KNOW 
 
4.2.1 Some striking similarities  
How does Williamson’s (2000) KF thesis compare to the KNOW hypothesis? Of 
course, in some ways the two projects are unrelated: the KF is set squarely in the 
domain of analytic epistemology, and is supposed to be the foundation of a theory 
that would explain a host of concepts and norms already discussed in that literature, 
whereas the KNOW hypothesis is a semantic thesis positing the presence of an 
indefinable concept in all the world’s languages. And whereas NSM uses the results 
of cross-linguistic semantic investigation as evidence for the prime status of KNOW, 
Williamson’s view is paradigmatic of a traditional philosophical approach in 
appealing to philosophical argumentation over empirical evidence. Yet the views do 
look similar, and I would argue that there are several points where the two positions 
are interestingly concordant with one another. I will consider these similarities first, 
before looking at some of the ways in which the views diverge.  
                                                
61 And see Wierzbicka (2006: 216-18) on at least one common meaning of ‘believe that’ used in ordinary English that 
actually contains KNOW. 
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Firstly, it is pleasing to note that Williamson explicitly states his thesis in 
terms of ‘knows’, and not ‘knowledge’. Many epistemologists claim to be interested 
in the folk concept of knowing yet explicitly talk about the concept of ‘knowledge’ 
rather than ‘know(s)’ or ‘knowing’, despite the lack of evidence that the former 
concept is really a part of folk epistemology.62 Secondly, and more substantially, I 
believe some of the evidence used by each position could be used to bolster the 
other. Thus a proponent of NSM could take some of Williamson’s arguments for 
KF to bolster the proposal that the concept of ‘knowing’ really cannot be 
semantically analysed. Take the inductive argument, which was the idea that the 
state of the epistemological literature since Gettier (1963) points to the possibility 
that no adequate analysis of ‘know(s)’ will ever emerge: this would make perfect 
sense if the NSM proposal is right. And conversely, the fact that counterparts of 
KNOW have been found in all languages studied by NSM researchers thus far is the 
expected result if Williamson is right in asserting that there exists an irreducible 
‘knows’ concept, fundamental to the epistemic lives of human beings, through 
which all other epistemic notions must be understood (Williamson 2000: 184–208). 
A third interesting point of convergence relates to Williamson’s distinct 
concepts argument. As discussed, Williamson claims that ‘knows’ is a strictly 
mental concept, and therefore it cannot be defined in terms of any non-mental 
concepts. This is contrary to virtually every analysis of knowledge ever proposed, 
in which ‘true’ figures as a key component – for however we might want to 
characterise the concept ‘true’, it isn’t plausibly “mental”. This argument sits well 
with the NSM proposal that TRUE is also a prime, distinct from (and certainly not a 
possible component of) KNOW. In fact, the current NSM proposal about TRUE allows 
                                                
62 e.g. Ichikawa & Steup (2014), and McGinn (1984). 
 59 
 
us to see the independence of two concepts more clearly, in that the universal 
grammar of TRUE reveals just how different it is from KNOW. In particular, the very 
restricted combinatorial possibilities posited for TRUE reveal that the concept is 
essentially metalinguistic in character, i.e. it can only apply to what people can say 
or think (Wierzbicka ms.; Goddard 2008: 79). This is obviously very unlike the 
grammar for KNOW, which has no such metalinguistic function, and instead shares 
combinatorial properties with the other mental and experiential predicates, such as 
WANT, SEE and HEAR (§2.2). Of course, this doesn’t address the issue of the intuition 
that ‘know’ entails ‘true’, in spite of their independence; I will discuss this in §4.3. 
 
4.2.2 Criticisms of Williamson from an NSM perspective 
Naturally, there are also some points on which the two positions do not 
align. In particular, I believe that the NSM perspective brings out (at least) two 
problems for Williamson’s (2000) thesis, and discussing them illustrates the 
interdisciplinary relevance of NSM. Firstly, Williamson’s (2000) view of the 
semantics of ‘knows’ is not in line with the current proposal for the grammar of 
KNOW. That is, the philosopher focusses on propositional knowledge, taking 
‘knows’ as semantically basic as it appears in sentences like ‘S knows that p’. As 
we saw in §2.3.2, however, the ‘know that’ construction has been shown to be 
semantically complex. 
A second point of disagreement relates to Williamson’s (2000) argument 
from false expectations, viz. the idea that philosophically important concepts 
shouldn’t be expected to have reductive conceptual analyses. This sort of argument 
could never be used to support the hypothesis that knowing (or any other concept) 
represents an NSM prime; it is simply unjustified to assume that the concepts 
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deemed significant in a given philosophical tradition are universal and unanalysable. 
For example, mind and justice loom large in analytic philosophy, yet both are 
conceptually complex and culturally specific, and are therefore far from being 
candidates for prime membership.63 In fact, I would argue that the argument from 
false expectations actually fails to support Williamson’s KF thesis for the same 
reason. Regardless of the philosophical uses Williamson intends to make of KF, to 
claim that a concept is fundamental to human beings in any important sense is ipso 
facto to claim that the concept is present in the conceptual systems of speakers of 
languages other than one’s own, for which our primary source of evidence is 
linguistic data. Therefore I don’t think Williamson can legitimately draw on the 
preoccupations of analytic philosophers to support the claim that a given concept is 
fundamental, any more than one could propose an addition to the NSM prime 
inventory based only on the impression that a certain concept from one’s native 
language feels simple and irreducible. 
Though something of a side note, it is worth pointing out that this criticism, 
essentially that of ethnocentrism, doesn’t just apply to Williamson; it is an objection 
that can be laid against the analytic project and philosophical conceptual analysis 
more generally. Typical philosophical conceptual analyses involve no discussion 
about whether or not the concepts (neither analysans nor analysandum) are cross-
linguistically universal. In spite of this, the resulting piece of conceptual analysis 
isn’t presented as being limited to the conceptual system of one linguistic or cultural 
group. What this means, I believe, is that the method of conceptual analysis 
employed in philosophy is often just a poor substitute for NSM research, because it 
aims at something that its methods cannot deliver, viz. a reductive analysis of a 
                                                
63 On the cultural specificity of ‘mind’ see Wierzbicka (2016: 457ff), and on ‘justice’, see Wierzbicka (2006: 155-160). 
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concept not confined to a given language or culture. This is not to deny that 
philosophical conceptual analysis can shed light on our intuitions about a given 
concept, just that it leaves open the crucial question about whether those intuitions 
are bound to a specific language or culture, or instead pertain to aspects of a shared 
human concept.  
Returning to Williamson’s (2000) view, do the foregoing criticisms suggest 
that the knowledge-first project in epistemology cannot stand independently of the 
NSM proposal about KNOW? In a sense, I think this is right. That is, while it seems 
clear that NSM research into the properties of KNOW can proceed without the 
philosophical arguments provided by Williamson (however insightful they may be), 
I would argue that the converse is not true. Important parts of Williamson’s project 
are not independent of the facts about the cross-linguistic semantics of ‘knowing’, 
and as long the NSM project continues to enjoy success, there is good reason to 
think that it is uniquely capable of establishing what these cross-linguistic facts are. 
Of course, the success of Williamson’s model of epistemology may not depend on 
each and every detail of the specific KNOW proposal, but I do think the two criticisms 
discussed here warrant attention. That is, it is important that the argument from false 
expectations cannot properly be regarded to support the KF thesis, on pain of 
ethnocentrism. Similarly, the NSM finding that ‘know that’ constructions are 
semantically definable matters for Williamson’s view, though a treatment of how 
exactly the KF model should be adjusted in light of this is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
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4.3 Does knowing entail truth? 
According to the standard picture, knowledge entails truth and belief. As I discussed 
in §4.1.2, Williamson explicitly supports the entailment for ‘true’, though denying 
that it is a constituent condition of ‘knows’, but he is not so clearly committed to the 
entailment for ‘believe’. But what can NSM say about these putative entailments, 
given that just like KF, we cannot treat either ‘true’ or ‘believe’ as semantic 
components of KNOW? I will not consider here how to deal with the intuition that 
‘know’ entails ‘believe’, except to note that this would have to be chalked up to an 
English-specific (maybe even Anglo philosopher-specific) phenomenon because 
‘believe’ is not a cross-linguistically universal concept (see §5.2.2). As far as the 
entailment between ‘know’ and ‘true’ is concerned, however, it is possible that this 
represents a universal intuition, given that both KNOW and TRUE are primes. And in 
fact, NSM provides the framework for testing these intuitions in a rigorous manner. 
That is, there is no reason why we couldn’t test speakers’ responses to NSM 
scenarios involving KNOW and TRUE in order to gauge their intuitions on whether 
some sort of non-compositional entailment relation exists between them. Consider 
these two possible “scripts” (where (3) would only be be tested in languages with 
equivalent propositional knowledge constructions): 
 
(2) When I know something, if someone says it, I can think like this:  
“this is true” 
 
(3) Oslo knows that Oslo is the capital of Norway 
                  because of this, if someone says: “Oslo is the capital of Norway” Umberto can 
think like this:  
“this is true” 
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Such suggestions are rough, and it would require considerable thought to ensure that 
both the NSM script and experimental design are right, such that we do in fact 
measure respondents’ agreement that TRUE is somehow entailed by KNOW. But the 
point I want to make is that NSM provides the means to test this intuition about the 
relationship between ‘knowing’ and ‘truth’, and not just on ordinary English 
speakers but on speakers of a wide variety of languages. And if lay speakers of a 
good cross-section of languages did tend to find statements like those of (2) and (3) 
felicitous, then this could be argued to demonstrate a legitimate, albeit non-
compositional, semantic relationship between KNOW and TRUE.  
 
Chapter 5. Cultural variation in ‘knows’ in 
experimental philosophy 
 
This chapter is focussed on connecting the universality of KNOW to the experimental 
philosophy literature. 
 
5.1 Weinberg, Nichols & Stich (2001) 
Before going on, let me characterise “experimental philosophy”. As 
Buckwalter et al. (2015) puts it, “experimental philosophers apply the methods 
commonly associated with psychology (experimentation, statistical analysis, 
developmental research, […]) but they use those methods to address the kinds of 
questions that have been traditionally associated with philosophy.” Experimental 
 64 
 
philosophy is essentially a movement in metaphilosophy, its practitioners united by 
shared methodological assumptions about what kind of evidence should be attended 
to in answering philosophical questions, especially when proposing conceptual 
analyses of ordinary concepts. Thus experimental philosophy often involves testing 
the responses of ordinary people to hypothetical scenarios, in order to evaluate the 
conceptual analyses proposed by traditional philosophers. Experimental philosophy 
methods have been applied to a range of topics in moral philosophy, free will and 
the mind-body problem, but our focus is on Weinberg, Nichols and Stich (2001, 
henceforth WNS), whose study centered on epistemic intuitions.  
Before outlining the study, it is important to stress that WNS, and 
experimental philosophers more generally, see themselves as attacking what they 
take to be philosophers’ unquestioned reliance on their own intuitions in doing 
conceptual analysis (2001: 431–4). The target of the critique is the “method of 
possible cases” (e.g. Jackson 1998), which involves taking one’s “intuitions about 
hypothetical cases as evidence in evaluating analyses of philosophically important 
concepts, like the concept of knowledge” (Machery et al. 2015: 2). The problem 
with this method is that while traditional philosophers take themselves to be 
analysing ordinary “folk” concepts, they do not actually verify that their intuitions 
hold in the wider population. In other words, experimental philosophers ask: who 
exactly is the “we” who philosophers attribute a given intuition, e.g. the intuition 
that Gettier cases are not instances of knowing? Experimental philosophy applied 
to epistemology thus amounts to a challenge the analytic project as it is traditionally 
conceived. Note that while we will be presenting NSM-informed objections to WNS 
and like studies, an NSM sympathiser can perfectly well agree with experimental 
philosophers that the methods of the analytic project are highly questionable.  
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Now let us consider WNS’s (2001) findings. In the experiment we are 
considering, undergraduate students from different cultural backgrounds were 
presented with hypothetical scenarios designed to test whether or not their epistemic 
intuitions matched those of Anglo philosophers.64 Participants were divided into 
three categories according to their cultural background: Western (Americans with 
European heritage), East Asian (participants of Chinese, Japanese, and Korean 
descent) and Indian subcontinent (participants of Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi 
descent). (Following WNS, I will abbreviate these to W, EA and SC.) The 
experiment consisted of knowledge attribution tasks, in which participants are asked 
to say if a third-person subject of a hypothetical scenario knows a given proposition. 
Several epistemic intuitions were tested, but the Gettier intuition (§4.1.1) will be our 
focus here. So the Gettier case presented to subjects was as follows:65 
 
(1) The American Car 
Bob has a friend, Jill, who has driven a Buick for many years. Bob therefore thinks 
that Jill drives an American car. He is not aware, however, that her Buick has 
recently been stolen, and he is also not aware that Jill has replaced it with a Pontiac, 
which is a different kind of American car. Does Bob really know that Jill drives an 
American car, or does he only believe it? 
 
Respondents were given the option to select ‘Really knows’ or ‘Only believes’.  
74% of Westerners selected ‘Only believes’, thereby denying that Bob knows that 
Jill drives an American car. This suggests that a large majority of ordinary English 
speakers of European ancestry share the Gettier intuition with analytic 
                                                
64 Note that WNS also measured and found variation in responses to according to socioeconomic status, but we will not 
be concerned with these results here. 
65 Note that this particular case was tested on 66 Ws, 23 EAs, and 23 SCs. 
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philosophers: JTB is not sufficient for knowledge. The figures for subjects in the 
EA and SC categories, however, were quite different: a mere 47% and 39%, 
respectively. Apparently, then, a majority of EA and SC respondents (53% and 
61%) don’t have the Gettier intuition.  
As WNS see it, these results show that, for whatever reason, epistemic 
intuitions vary according to cultural background, directly undermining the analytic 
project which takes such intuitions to be fixed. For our purposes, however, the 
relevant question is whether such results show that these groups are working with 
different concepts of ‘knowing’, and thus that the concept represented by the KNOW 
prime may not be universal across languages and cultures. 
 
 
5.2 Method and metalanguage  
In this section, the first part of my response to WNS, I will argue that the study has 
both general and specifically linguistic methodological problems, which throw 
doubt on the validity of its results, thereby undercutting any possible threat to the 
universality of the KNOW prime. 
 
5.2.1 General methodological issues and non-epistemic sources of variation 
There are a number of ways one might question the validity of WNS’s study. A 
couple of the more obvious objections relating to WNS’s sample should be made 
with caution, however. First is the fact that the sample size is modest and very 
uneven across the ethnicity categories, with the Gettier case above being tested on 
66 Ws compared to 23 each of EAs and SCs. While this is far from optimal, it 
doesn’t amount to a strong objection given that WNS chose a statistical test that is 
 67 
 
supposed to have a good degree of statistical power on small and unequal sample 
sizes (Fisher’s exact). Second is the fact that the sample is very skewed in terms of 
education level and probably SES (Socio-Economic Status) too, with most 
participants being undergraduate students of Rutgers.66 This is certainly unideal, but 
it isn’t clear how it threatens their findings, i.e. it is hard to say exactly why making 
the participants more varied in terms of education level (or SES) would eliminate 
the cross-cultural variation found. However, while these shortcomings cannot be 
classed as objections, I would say that in light of the failure of more recent studies 
which aimed to replicate WNS’s findings and which involved greater numbers of 
participants and/or a more varied source of participants (e.g. Seyedsayamdost 2015; 
Turri 2013), the restricted sampling of WNS should give us pause.  
The first full-blown objection comes from Starmans and Friedman (2012: 
273f), who make the important point that the Gettier scenarios presented to 
participants in WNS are not compared with well-structured control cases, meaning 
that in the case of (1) above, the “Gettiered” aspect of the subject’s position was not 
actually isolated for testing. 
A second serious objection, or set of objections, surrounds WNS’ failure to 
address the possible interference of non-epistemic factors in accounting for their 
results. That is, the cross-cultural variation that was detected may be due to 
differences between the groups that are totally unrelated to the knowledge 
attribution task. For example, there may be cultural variation in how much attention 
is paid to contextual or pragmatic cues, unconnected to the epistemic theme of the 
vignettes (Cullen 2010). Consider that Haberstroh (et al. 2002, cited in Cullen 2010) 
found that Chinese participants are “more sensitive to conversational norms” and 
                                                
66 I say ‘most’ because some of the EA data was obtained in Asia and presumably not from Rutgers students (p. 456f), 
even though WNS suggest elsewhere that all participants were from Rutgers (p. 439). 
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are more concerned with “observ[ing] the maxims of conversational conduct” than 
Western participants. It is possible, then, that the differences in responses between 
the W and EA categories might be due to differences in how the participants 
interpreted conversational cues implicit in the scenarios or survey instructions. For 
a specific example, it is possible that EA and SC participants were more likely to 
select “really knows” due to an acquiescence bias.67 The point is that even without 
identifying the particular pragmatic cues that could have led EA participants to 
respond differently, it is a live possibility that there may be a host of such factors 
that are jointly responsible for the results found by WNS, and it is problematic that 
these authors do not pause to consider any possible non-epistemic sources of the 
variation.  
Of course, WNS are not alone in making the mistake of assuming that the 
results of such studies directly inform us about the (epistemic or other) intuitions of 
ordinary people. As Cullen (2010) puts it, experimental philosophers haven’t yet 
addressed how exactly “conclusions about folk intuitions follow from people’s 
responses to their surveys”; instead, they seem to have simply “proceeded on the 
assumption that intuitions can be simply read off from survey responses”. And if 
there is an array of possible non-epistemic factors that might (separately or together) 
explain the reported variation in responses, WNS’s belief that they are merely 
displaying the “brute facts” (p. 451) of variable epistemic intuitions is much too 
hasty. 
 
 
5.2.2 Linguistic-specific methodological issues  
                                                
67 See Johnson et al. (2005) on less affluent and less individualistic countries (including Asian countries) being more 
prone to an acquiescent or “yea-saying” response style. 
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There are also serious linguistic problems with WNS’s methods, which more 
directly undermine any challenge these results could pose to the KNOW hypothesis. 
More generally, I would argue that these problems make it unlikely that WNS’s 
findings bear at all on the semantics of the ‘know’ concept, their intended target. 
The most glaring issue, then, is that WNS present participants with the 
choice between two responses: “really knows” and “only believes”, which is plainly 
not equivalent to the contrast between ‘knows’ and ‘believes’. That is, as is obvious 
from the point of view of lexical semantics, ‘really’ and ‘only’ contribute their own 
semantic content. So in (1) participants are simply not being asked if Bob knows 
that Jill drives an American car; they are being asked whether he really knows it. 
Consequently, WNS’s findings cannot actually be taken to pertain to the ordinary 
concept of ‘knows’, but instead apply to the meaning of ‘really knows’. And 
consider that if Wierzbicka’s (2002) explications of ‘really’ and ‘real’ are on the 
right track, then ‘really’ implies some sort of contrast with mere appearances, i.e. in 
this case, a contrast between real and apparent knowing. If this is right, then some 
participants in the WNS study may have felt that a greater degree of certainty was 
required for them to select “really knows” over “only believes”, because the addition 
of ‘really’ put them in mind of a stronger knowing, not the knowing of mere 
appearances. Whatever the best way to account for the meaning of ‘really knows’, 
the point remains that it is extremely unlikely that the addition of ‘really’ and ‘only’ 
did not influence participants’ answers. Therefore WNS’s findings do not tell us 
about the ordinary ‘knowing’ concept, and by extension do not bear upon the 
universality of the KNOW prime. 
Secondly, there are also significant problems with the use of ‘believe’. 
Firstly, ‘believe’ is an English-specific concept which doesn’t have exact 
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equivalents even in all European languages (e.g. Russian; Gladvoka 2007). This 
limits the applicability of WNS’s findings to English concepts, which seems wrong 
given that WNS are trying to test cross-cultural and thus potentially cross-linguistic 
conceptual variation (in the sense that variation according to cultural background 
might be due to variation in participants’ conceptual resources, determined by their 
linguistic background). Worse still, it is not clear that the relevant sense of ‘believe’, 
used by philosophers (meaning something close, but perhaps not equivalent, to the 
‘think’), is actually used by ordinary speakers. That is, in ordinary English 
discourse, ‘believe that’ seems to be largely reserved for cases implying “a 
conviction or commitment, like taking a stand on some matter of importance” 
(Wierzbicka 2006: 216f), as opposed to being used to talk about ordinary things that 
one thinks are the case, such as that one’s friend owns an American car.  
A third serious linguistic criticism I have of WNS is that they that their non-
Western ethnicity categories are far too coarse grained. For one thing, those EA and 
SC participants who speak the language of their background aren’t distinguished 
from those who have no competence in the language of the ethnicity they identified 
with. Worse still, in the case of the EA category, some of the data was obtained “in 
Asia”68 and is simply lumped together with the data from Asian-American tertiary 
students (p. 456f). This criticism is serious because it means that the study doesn’t 
control for competence in another language, and gives us no way to tell whether or 
not subjects could be bringing concepts from that language to bear on the task. More 
generally, having such coarse-grained cultural background categories means that 
there is no way to estimate how steeped in the culture of their background the 
participants were, and therefore we have no measure of the extent of the possible 
                                                
68 The scenarios were presumably still presented to participants in English, though WNS do not actually specify this. 
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influence of that cultural background on their responses, which is supposed to be 
the subject of WNS’s findings. 
Finally, it should also be noted that WNS explicitly tested the ‘know that’ 
construction (as do all experimental epistemology studies that I am aware of)69. 
While this doesn’t invalidate the results as they pertain to the meaning of that 
construction, it does limit the applicability of the study to those languages where an 
exact equivalent of the propositional knowledge construction is found. This also 
means that the possible relevance of such findings to the KNOW prime, for which the 
know-that construction is not a basic syntactic frame, is unclear. 
 
5.3 A non-semantic explanation: Epistemic norms and cultural 
scripts 
As a final nail in the coffin of any possible challenge to the KNOW prime, I will now 
show why I think that even if WNS-style conclusions were valid, it would not be 
problematic for the KNOW hypothesis, essentially because cross-cultural variation in 
epistemic intuitions is not plausibly explained in terms of the compositional 
semantics of ‘knowing’. That is, imagine there is genuine cross-cultural or cross-
linguistic variation in knowledge attribution tasks that isn’t confounded by non-
epistemic factors of the kind discussed in §5.2.1. Such variation, I contend, is most 
likely to be adequately explained in terms of different epistemic norms – what might 
be described as pragmatic differences in speakers’ application of ‘knows’ – which 
should be able to be captured in terms of NSM cultural scripts.  
To see why this is plausible, first consider the fact that we may have all sorts of 
“intuitions” about the implications of utterances that are simply not plausibly part 
                                                
69 e.g. Starmans & Friedman (2012), Turri (2013), Nagel et al. (2013), Buckwalter (2014), and Machery et al. (2015).  
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of the meaning of the concepts involved in that utterance, certainly not in the sense 
of their compositional semantics (the sense of meaning that is of interest to the NSM 
program). For example, my intuition that the utterance “A man sprinted down the 
street” describes a man moving faster than 10 kilometres but slower than 40 
kilometres per hour is not plausibly part of the semantics of “sprint”, but is 
accounted for by more general beliefs I have about human beings and the minimum 
and maximum speeds at which we can run (in addition to my understanding of the 
meaning of words involved, of course). Other people’s intuitions about the likely 
running speed of the man in the scenario may very well vary, but this would be 
nowhere near sufficient to show that the speakers are working with different 
concepts of sprinting.70 It is simply much more parsimonious to say that people have 
different beliefs about the maximum and minimum speeds of human beings, 
depending on, no doubt, their experience and expertise on the subject. And this 
applies equally well to the NSM primes; that is, we should expect to have any 
number of such “intuitions” involving the concepts represented by the primes. Some 
of these intuitions may be robust across individuals and cultural or linguistic groups, 
others may language- or culture-specific. There may even be universal intuitions 
involving how the primes relate to one another, i.e. essentially non-compositional 
relationships between primes, as I have suggested may exist for KNOW and TRUE 
(chapter 4). But the crux is that such intuitions have no effect on the hypothesis that 
KNOW (or any other prime) is a universal concept. 
In fact, notice how difficult it would be to positively show how different 
intuitions resulted from genuinely semantic features of the unique knowing concepts 
                                                
70 Perhaps some theorists would say exactly this, but I would counter that making this leap amounts to a complete erosion 
of the distinction between semantic facts and all other beliefs speakers bring to each instance of applying a word in the 
world, which I believe is an untenable position. 
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of the different groups. One would really have to provide adequate reductive 
analyses of the different knowledge concepts, which would have to show how 
Gettier cases are ruled out by the components or conditions of the English or 
Western concept, but not by the components or conditions of the non-Western 
(Indian, Chinese, etc.) concept. As we saw in chapter 4, however, no analysis of 
(English) ‘knows’ has yet succeeded. Pending such proposed definitions, it looks 
like there is a strong case for the idea that even with more robust findings indicating 
the kind of cross-cultural or cross-linguistic variation WNS set out to prove, this 
doesn’t ipso facto prove that there are different concepts of knowledge in the sense 
that both traditional analytic philosophers and semanticists are interested in. 
So if epistemic intuitions, such as the Gettier intuition, are not semantic, then 
how are they to be explained? As I have intimated, a parsimonious answer is that 
they are essentially epistemic norms, the like of which should be explicable in terms 
of NSM cultural scripts, in particular, different norms governing when speakers of 
a certain group are prepared to say that some subject ‘knows’ something. Here I 
would like to suggest a general direction for the sort of different epistemic cultural 
scripts we may expect to find, pending, of course, detailed investigation in 
individual cases. Consider first the idea that when we as human beings say that know 
something, we can typically say why we know it. Thus KNOW often participates in 
constructions like the following: ‘I know (this) because I saw it’, ‘I know (this) 
because I heard it’, and ‘I know (this) because people say it’.71 As I see it, it makes 
perfect sense that different groups and individuals may disagree on which sources 
of knowledge should be prioritised or most highly valued. In other words, we can 
expect groups to disagree on questions such as what constitutes good evidence and 
                                                
71 See Wierzbicka’s (1994) account of evidential markers. 
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who counts as a good authority. In fact, we should expect not just cultural variation 
in such matters, but variation between specialist groups or subcultures (such as 
philosophers vs. non-philosophers)72. For example, whether or not someone says 
that she knows something based on a dream depends on whether or not she thinks 
she can trust to dreams as a source of knowledge about the future, her own 
subconscious feelings, etc.73 Similarly, someone’s religious beliefs can be expected 
to affect whether or not she is prepared to say that she knows something told to her 
by a religious authority. Take Wierzbicka’s (in press) example of the biblical figure, 
Martha of Bethany, who says of her dead brother, Lazarus: “I know he will rise 
again”, in response to Jesus telling her ‘Your brother will rise again’.74 Many 
contemporary English speakers will find it more natural to say of Martha that she 
believes rather than knows that her brother will be resurrected, and this can be 
accounted for by different cultural (and individual) attitudes in relation to whether 
or not knowing can be applied to “something that cannot be logically proved or 
experimentally demonstrated” (Wierzbicka loc. cit.).75 Of course, giving a detailed 
positive account of particular epistemic norms of a particular cultural or linguistic 
(or specialist) group requires in-depth research in each case, beyond the scope of 
this thesis. But the crucial point is that as long as NSM cultural scripts can describe 
the epistemic intuitions of particular groups, and in so doing, account for the 
variation between groups, then any cross-linguistic or cross-cultural variation in 
                                                
72 Indeed, some authors already claim to have found such variation between lay speakers and philosophers, e.g. Starmans 
and Friedman (2012). 
73 See Goddard & Wierzbicka (2015b) for an explication of Jukurrpa (‘The Dreaming’) in Aboriginal Australian culture, 
which incorporates the idea that one can know things from seeing whilst asleep (i.e. dreaming). 
74 John (11: 23-24). 
75 An important point here is that there is actually a cultural-historical story to be told that explains some specifically 
Anglo epistemic norms. In particular, there are epistemic cultural scripts of the modern Anglo world, traceable to Locke, 
which center on being cautious about saying one knows something unless one is completely sure (e.g. “it is not good if 
a person says “I know it” if they don’t know it”) (See Wierzbicka 2006: 37-41). 
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results of WNS-style studies do not pose a threat to the universality of the KNOW 
prime. 
 
5.4 The importance of metalanguage: using NSM in 
experimental philosophy 
As a final thought, it is also worth discussing the idea that the methodology of 
studies like WNS, i.e. experimental philosophy studies aiming to test cultural or 
linguistic universality/variation in knowledge attribution, could be much improved 
if the scenarios were presented in language approaching NSM, perhaps an NSM 
“augmented” with some complex concepts to allow for more natural scenarios.76 
Wierzbicka (in press) thinks “[i]t is certainly possible, and important, to investigate 
different cultural attitudes” to knowing, but she insists that we can only make 
genuine comparisons with the aid of a “common measure, a tertium comparationis”, 
i.e. NSM, and in particular, the canonical sentences of KNOW. As for how NSM 
could be incorporated in these studies, here is a suggestion of an NSM version of 
the question posed to WNS’s participants:  
 
 
(2)  Bob thinks like this: Jill owns an American car 
                   True          Not true 
 
(3)  Jill owns an American car, Bob knows this 
                    True          Not true 
 
                                                
76 See Goddard & Wierzbicka (2014c: 2) on augmented Minimal English, whence I get this idea. 
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Constructing experimental philosophy studies in NSM is obviously 
especially crucial if the aim is to test intuitions in multiple languages, as in Machery 
et al. (2015), who set out to test the Gettier intuition on speakers of four different 
languages (English, Japanese, Bengali, and Portuguese). Unfortunately, this study 
too falls foul of the sort of linguistic methodology problems encountered by WNS 
(§5.2.2), but its shortcomings are instructive. For while they improved on certain 
aspects, by for example, asking participants only if the subject ‘knows’ or ‘doesn’t 
know’ (omitting both the “really knows”–“only believes” problem of WNS, and the 
culturally-specific ‘believe’), there is still precious little discussion of the possible 
metalanguage and translation issues involved. For example, they say that 
“Americans, Brazilians, Indians, and Japanese were much more likely to agree with 
the statement ‘The protagonist feels like she knows that p, but she doesn’t actually 
know that p’ in the Gettier cases than in the clear knowledge case” (p. 7), without 
any discussion of whether the concepts being used to translate the English-specific 
‘actually’, or the construction ‘feels like she knows’ have exact or near equivalents 
in Japanese, Portuguese and Bengali. It is also interesting to note that whereas all 
the results of their statistical tests are reported in an appendix for the statistically 
proficient to inspect for problems, nowhere do Machery et al. (2015) provide the 
versions of vignettes as presented in the other languages, for the linguistically-
informed readers to inspect for translation issues, suggesting to me the misguided 
assumption that the language in which the scenarios are presented is not significant, 
that unlike the statistical results, it is not “data”. 
 The upshot of this chapter is twofold: 1) the KNOW prime stands strong 
against what might be perceived as a potential challenge from experimental 
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philosophy, and 2) the methodology of such studies may be notably improved by 
presenting participants with something closer to NSM. 
 
 
Chapter 6. Conclusion and directions for further 
research 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to take an in-depth look at the semantic prime KNOW 
of Natural Semantic Metalanguage, considering both linguistic and philosophical 
aspects to the proposal that it represents a cross-linguistically universal and 
semantically basic concept. I hope to have shown both that the KNOW hypothesis is 
holding up well to cross-linguistic testing, notwithstanding some issues that require 
further testing to be resolved, and that the KNOW claim has a host of interesting 
implications for, and applications to, philosophy, both traditional and experimental 
varieties. 
As I see it, there is no shortage of interesting directions for further research 
in relation to the material covered in this thesis, both within the NSM program and 
beyond. The most important, of course, is to continue testing the KNOW hypothesis 
in new languages. It is also important to revisit the languages in which KNOW has 
already been attested to ensure that the revised syntactic frames now associated with 
the prime do not present problems in these languages. One specific avenue that 
would be particularly worthwhile pursuing is a thorough investigation into Kalam’s 
interprime polysemy between KNOW, SEE, and HEAR – or if not Kalam, a language 
with a similar profile of polysemy between mental/experiential primes. I argued in 
 78 
 
Chapter 3 that what is required here is to show that speakers interpret each prime as 
distinct concepts, despite their identical lexical form and some shared combinatorial 
features, and I suggested that such a case may benefit from testing beyond the 
standard language-internal ones, ideally involving controlled behavioural 
experiments measuring speakers’ semantic intuitions. A second specific issue that 
needs further investigation is the existence of the trivalency option in Mangaaba-
Mbula (or nearby languages), in light of Bugenhagen’s comments that such 
constructions are absent in the language.  
As far as the intersection with philosophy is concerned, there are several 
very promising avenues for future research, all in connection to the testing of 
speakers’ intuitions about knowing. Firstly, it would be interesting to test speakers’ 
intuitions about how KNOW relates to TRUE, to better understand the non-
compositional relationship that seems to exist between these primes. Secondly, 
experimental philosophy studies aiming to test cross-linguistic or cross-cultural 
variation in epistemic intuitions could be made significantly more rigorous by 
implementing questionnaires based on NSM. If such variation in epistemic 
intuitions were then found, the next step would be to attempt to construct NSM 
cultural scripts to account for cultural (subcultural etc.) differences in how the 
concept of ‘knowing’ is applied to the world. In general, then, NSM theory and 
accompanying methodology presents an invaluable prism through which we can 
assess both the cross-cultural universality and variation in human conceptual 
systems. As the KNOW hypothesis, and the NSM project in general, continues to 
garner empirical support, we should expect it to have significant consequences, 
reaching far beyond semantics, both in the cognitive sciences and in philosophy, in 
all its many guises. 
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Appendix I. NSM Primes, English Exponents 
(2015) 
 
 
I-ME, YOU, SOMEONE, PEOPLE SOMETHING~THING, BODY 
 
Substantives 
KIND,   PART relational 
THIS, THE SAME,   OTHER~ELSE determines  
ONE,   TWO,   MUCH~MANY,   LITTLE~FEW,   SOME,   ALL quantifiers  
GOOD,   BAD evaluators  
BIG,   SMALL descriptors 
THINK,   KNOW,   WANT,  DON’T WANT,   FEEL,   SEE,   HEAR mental/experiential predicates 
SAY,   WORDS,   TRUE speech 
DO,   HAPPEN,   MOVE,   TOUCH actions, events, movement, contact  
THERE IS/EXIST,  BE(SOMEWHERE),  BE (SOMEONE/SOMETHING), 
BE (MINE) 
location, existence, possession, 
specification  
LIVE,   DIE life and death  
WHEN~TIME, A LONG TIME,   A SHORT TIME,   (FOR) SOME TIME,   
MOMENT,   NOW,   BEFORE,   AFTER 
time 
WHERE~PLACE~SOMEWHERE,   HERE,   ABOVE,   BELOW,   NEAR,   
FAR,  ON ONE SIDE,   INSIDE 
space 
NOT,   MAYBE,   CAN,   BECAUSE,   IF logical concepts  
VERY,   MORE~ANYMORE intensifier, augmentor  
LIKE~WAY~AS similarity 
 
†Where tilde (~) indicates allolexes of a prime, that is multiple realisations of the same prime in one language, dictated 
by different grammatical contexts. 
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Appendix II. Sample explications 
 
 
1. someone’s mind  (Wierzbicka 2016) 
something 
this something is part of this someone 
people can’t see this something 
this something is not part of this someone’s body 
when this someone is thinking about something 
something happens in this part 
 
because this someone has this part, it is like this: 
this someone can think many things about many things 
this someone can know many things about many things  
 
 
 
2. Someone x was depressed at this time (Goddard 2011) 
 
someone X thought like this at this time: 
‘good things can’t happen to me 
if I want to do anything good, I can’t do it 
I can’t do anything’ 
because of this, this someone felt something bad at this time 
like someone can feel when they think like this 
it is bad for someone if this someone thinks like this 
 
 
 
3.  women[m]† (Goddard & Wierzbicka 2014a) 
 
people of one kind 
people of this kind are not children[m]  
people of this kind have bodies of one kind 
the bodies of people of this kind are like this: 
 inside the body of someone of this kind there can be for some time a living body of a 
child[m] 
 
 
† Where [m] stands for a semantic molecule, that is, semantically definable “mid-level” concept, via which other 
concepts are understood. In this case women and children are proposed to be universal molecules, found in all 
languages. See Goddard (2012: 719:728) on semantic molecules. 
 
 
 
